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ABSTRACT
VETO PLAYERS AND POLITICAL DECISION MAKING
Arzu K¬br¬s
PhD, Political Science
Supervisor: Prof.Dr.Meltem Müftüler Baç
Spring 2010, X+94 pages
This dissertation studies political decision making through a veto players approach
which entails identifying those political actors with the power to veto the decision, and
understanding the political outcome as a product of the interaction of these actors.
The veto players literature so far takes veto players as simple, domestic actors with
given preferences that are common knowledge to everyone. This approach leaves out
any strategic interaction that may take place among veto players as it treats them as
commonly known preference proles, and thus creates serious gaps in the literature.
This dissertation aims to ll these gaps in the literature by treating veto players, and
those third parties that the veto players are accountable to as strategic actors in the
game of politics which may take place in limited-information settings. The second
important factor that the literature has not explored yet is the emergence of new veto
players. This dissertation acknowledges that in certain policy areas the set of relevant
veto players may include foreign actors as well as domestic ones, and analyzes how the
emergence and the existence of these new players inuence political decision making and
the resulting policies. Finally, the fact that veto players in a political system are either
elected or appointed, and thus are usually accountable to those who elect or appoint
them, is the third factor that the veto players literature has yet to take into account.
This dissertation includes those third parties as strategic players in the game of political
decision making, and thus contributes towards lling out this gap in the literature. The
chapters investigate general questions on institutions and political decision making while
drawing upon specic examples from Turkish politics using formal analysis, and game
theoretical and statistical tools.
Keywords: Political decision making, veto players, strategic interaction, formal
analysis, game theory.
iv
ÖZET
VETO OYUNCULARI VE POL·IT·IK KARARLARIN ALINMASI
Arzu K¬br¬s
Doktor, Siyaset Bilimi
Dan¬¸sman: Prof.Dr.Meltem Müftüler Baç
Bahar 2010, X+94 sayfa
Bu tez, siyasi karar alma süreçlerini, bu kararlar üzerinde veto hakk¬na sahip politik
aktörlerin tan¬mlanmas¬ve kararlar¬n bu aktörler aras¬ili¸ski, etkiles¸im ve ileti¸simlerin
bir sonucu olarak ele al¬nmas¬olarak tan¬mlayabilece¼gimiz veto oyuncular¬yaklas¸¬m¬ile
incelemektedir. Veto oyuncular¬ literatürü s¸imdiye kadar veto oyuncular¬n¬tercihleri
herkes taraf¬ndan bilinen, basit ve yerel oyuncular olarak ele alm¬¸st¬r. Bu anlay¬¸s veto
oyuncular¬aras¬nda ortaya ç¬kabilecek stratejik ili¸ski, etkiles¸im ve ileti¸simleri gözard¬
etmektedir ve dolay¬s¬ile literatürde önemli bir eksikli¼ge yol açmaktadir. Bu tez, veto
oyuncular¬n¬stratejik politik aktörler olarak ele alarak literatürdeki bu önemli eksikli¼gin
giderilmesine katk¬sa¼glamaktad¬r. Mevcut literatürdeki bir di¼ger eksiklik globalizasyon,
ve demokratikles¸me gibi günümüz için çok yayg¬n ve önemli politik de¼gi¸simlerin sonucu
olarak ortaya ç¬kmakta olan yeni veto oyuncular¬n¬n ve bu yeni oyuncular¬n siyasi karar
alma süreçleri ve dolay¬s¬ile ortaya ç¬kan kararlar üzerindeki etkilerinin henüz incelen-
memi¸s olmas¬d¬r. Bu tezin literatüre bir di¼ger katk¬s¬, yeni veto oyuncular¬n¬n ortaya
ç¬kmas¬n¬n siyasi karar alma süreçleri ve bu süreçler sonucu ortaya ç¬kan kararlar üz-
erindeki etkilerinin incelenmesidir. Son olarak, mevcut literatür henüz veto oyuncular¬
ile bu oyuncular¬n hesap vermekle yükümlü olduklar¬ki¸si veya kurumlar aras¬ili¸skilerin
karar alma süreçlerini ve bu süreçler sonucu ortaya ç¬kan kararlar üzerindeki etkilerini
incelememi¸stir. Bu tez siyasi karar süreçlerinde bu tip ili¸skilerin etkilerini de göz önüne
almaktad¬r. Tezin bölümleri siyasi karar alma süreçleri ve bu süreçlerde rol alan veto
oyuncular¬ üzerine geni¸s kapsaml¬ sorular¬ Türk siyasi hayat¬ndan örnekler ¬¸s¬¼g¬nda,
oyun teorik ve istatistiksel formal analiz yöntemleri ile cevapland¬rmaktad¬r.
Anahtar kelimeler: Politik karar alma süreçleri, veto oyuncular¬, stratejik ili¸ski,
formal analiz, oyun teorisi.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Institutions have been a major area of scientic inquiry in political science. Detailed
examination of di¤erent institutional structures, and how these structures a¤ect the
political life of the polities they belong to have been widely studied. These studies led
to several important theories that shape up our understanding of institutions, and the
way scholars approach the subject. One very important way of understanding political
institutions is to look at them as veto players in the game of political decision making.
Of course not every political institution has veto power in every policy area, but given
the nature of the political decision to be made, identifying those with the power to veto
the decision, helps us better understand both the resulting decision, and the process of
making that decision. It also enables us to create a classication system under which
it is possible to compare all sorts of political systems since they all have veto players.
The veto players approach is thus a very generalizable one.
Interestingly, the related literature is still in its early phases in terms of the amount
of research done and the results derived. The literature so far takes veto players as
simple, domestic actors with given preferences that are common knowledge to everyone.
The resulting policy decision is then simply a policy that is preferred to the status quo
by all the relevant veto players. This approach leaves out three important factors
that, if included in the analysis, can lead to di¤erent results. First of all, it leaves out
any strategic interaction that may take place among veto players as it treats them as
commonly known preference proles. In other words, the literature so far has been
built upon two critical assumptions, namely that, the veto players are simple actors
rather than strategic ones, and that they act in a full information environment. These
two assumptions not only render the literature incomplete, it also ignores some crucial
dimensions that, if included, can lead to completely di¤erent results. This dissertation
lls this gap in the literature by treating veto players, and those third parties that
the veto players are accountable to as strategic actors in the game of politics which
may take place in limited-information settings. In a limited information environment
the preferences of some or all veto players might be private information which then
complicates matters for those actors who are to make a policy proposal to replace
the status quo. Not only that, such informational asymmetries enables, and/or leads
actors to act strategically. In other words, a veto player whose preferences are private
information to her, may or may not have incentives to declare her preferences truthfully.
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Similarly, other actors may or may not have incentives to take her declarations at face
value. In short, incorporating the informational structure in the game of political
decision making is crucial in understanding the resulting policy.
The second important factor that the literature has not explored yet is the emer-
gence of new veto players. As democratization gains speed around the world, political
systems get more complicated and more participatory. As a result, political decisions
now require a broader consensus in many parts of the world. Interestingly, in many
policy areas, the consensus that is required for a policy change now includes not only
domestic parties to the decision but also foreign countries, international organizations,
etc. In other words, in many policy areas veto players include both domestic and for-
eign players. How these two types of veto players di¤er from each other, how they
interact, and how this interaction a¤ects the resulting policies are other crucial aspects
that the veto players literature has yet to study. This dissertation acknowledges that
in certain policy areas the set of relevant veto players may include foreign actors as
well as domestic ones, and analyzes how the emergence and the existence of these new
players inuence political decision making and the resulting policies. The inclusion of
foreign actors as veto players is a novel approach, and it builds on the newly emerging
literature on this aspect.
Finally, the fact that veto players in a political system are either elected or ap-
pointed, and thus are usually accountable to those who elect or appoint them, is the
third factor that the veto players literature has yet to take into account. These third
parties may or may not be veto players themselves depending on the context. But the
accountability relations may a¤ect the way each veto player acts. Not only that, the
existing structure of veto players in a polity may a¤ect the choices of the above men-
tioned third parties when they are to elect or appoint a new veto player. The existing
literature lacks studies that include these strategic considerations while analyzing the
resulting policy decisions. This dissertation includes those third parties as strategic
players in the game of political decision making, and thus contributes towards lling
out this gap in the literature.
The chapters investigate general questions on institutions and political decision
making while drawing upon specic examples from Turkish politics. This enables me
to also shed some light, from a rational choice perspective, on some of the recent
puzzling observations from the Turkish political life. Moreover, it proves that Turkish
politics is not unique or sui generis as some observers like to call it. Rather, my
analyses demonstrate that it is a political system that can be studied and understood
within the general frameworks and theories of political science. Having said that, I
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must stress out that my dissertation is not a study of Turkish politics. Nevertheless, it
demonstrates how the Turkish political life can be a lucrative ground for political science
research. The ability to identify recurring patters as such is important in assessing the
generalizability of the ndings.
1.1 Literature Review
Veto players are individuals or collective actors whose agreement is required for a
change of the status quo(Tsebelis, 1995), or more simply, veto players are institutions
with the power to veto policy changes. The veto players approach to politics then
can be dened as the study of political systems, processes, and decisions through the
identication of those institutions or actors with the power to veto change. As is clear
from the denition, the veto players approach is highly versatile and can be applied to
all political systems.
The literature on veto players has greatly beneted from the works of George Tse-
belis. Although the concept is an old one, Tsebelis (1995) was the rst to generalize it
and demonstrate its applicability to all political systems. His rst article on the subject
focuses on how veto players determine the potential for policy change in a polity. He
develops a veto players theorywhich states that the potential for policy change in
a polity decreases with the number of veto players in that polity and their ideological
di¤erence from one another. Relatedly, he argues, political stability increases as the
potential for policy change decreases. In his follow-up work, Tsebelis (1999) empirically
tests the rst and most important prediction of his veto players theory; namely that
the number of signicant laws produced by a coalition government, particularly if there
are important ideological di¤erences among government partners, is signicantly lower
than the number of signicant laws produced by single-party government or by coali-
tions with partners that agree, using legislative data from fteen European countries
over the 1981-1991 period. The results support his predictions.
An important volume of work that stems from Tsebelisveto players theory con-
cerns the role of veto players with respect to economic policy, and more specically
with respect to budget decits, and ination (Roubini and Sachs 1989, McCubbins
1991, Alt and Lowry 1994) and hence belongs to the political economy literature. Ac-
cording to arguments raised in these works, the larger the number of veto players, the
more likely is each to ask for special favors for his or her constituency as a condition
for supporting legislation, and the higher the decit or ination rate will be. Franzese
(1996), in an analysis of budget decits in advanced industrialized countries, concludes
that countries with many veto players are locked into the same decit pattern (pol-
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icy stability), whereas, countries with a single-party government can move away from
preexisting patterns (potential for policy change). Similarly, Treisman (1998) studied
both advanced and developing countries and found that federal countries (i.e., many
veto players) are locked into patterns of high or low ination. Reilly (2005) studies the
e¤ects of veto players on trade policy and tests whether veto players a¤ect the ability of
states to change tari¤s and nontari¤ barriers in response to changing economic condi-
tions. The sample is a cross-national time-series collection of 23 countries. The results
o¤er support for Tsebelisargument that policy stability increases with the number of
veto players. Large numbers of institutional veto points are associated with smaller
percentage changes in both tari¤s and nontari¤ barriers. Keefer and Stasavage (2003)
approach the issue from a di¤erent angle and study the relation between the number of
veto players and credibility of monetary policy, particularly central bank independence.
They show that multiple veto players enhance credibility, depending on the extent of
uncertainty about the location of the status quo, on how agenda control is allocated
among the veto players, and on whether veto players have delegated policymaking au-
thority to independent agencies. In the context of monetary policy and independent
central banks, they nd evidence that political replacements of central bank governors
are less likely in the presence of multiple political veto players; this e¤ect, which in-
creases with the polarization of veto players, enhances central bank independence and
thus positively a¤ects the credibility of monetary policy.
A second stream of literature empirically tests the political implications of the veto
players theory. Kreppel (1997) tests the relation between the number of veto players
and the potential for policy change, and demonstrates the negative relation between
legislative output and the number of parties in government in Italy. Warwick (1994)
tests the relation between political stability and the ideological distance amongst veto
players in a polity. His results demonstrate a negative relation between the ideologi-
cal distance amongst government partners and the duration of government coalitions
in parliamentary democracies. Examining the German Bundesbank, Lohmann (1998)
tests the relation between bureaucratic independence and the number of veto play-
ers and concludes that bureaucratic independence increases with the number of veto
players. Supporting Lohmanns results, Bednar, Ferejohn, and Garrett (1996), who
examined the activism of the European Court of Justice, nd that the introduction
of qualied majority voting in the European Council (which reduces the number of
veto players in European institutions) led to a signicant reduction in judicial activism.
Similarly, Alivizatos (1995) nds that the most active judges are in the countries with
many veto players. Finally, in a recent paper, Cunningham (2006) studies the relation
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between the number of veto players and civil war duration. He argues that conicts
with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because
there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute, and
shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more di¢ cult. This veto
player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new data
set containing monthly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II.
The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players
and the duration of civil war.
Note that all of these studies are mainly about testing Tsebelisargument that there
is a positive relation between the number of veto players and policy stability in a polity.
In Chapter 2, I point to another factor that should be considered while assessing the
relation between the number of veto players and policy stability. I argue that the strate-
gic interaction between veto players and those third parties that they are accountable
to also plays a role in determining the extent and timing of policy change. Similarly, in
Chapter 3, I bring another important variable into the picture, namely information. I
demonstrate how informational deciencies can also lead to policy stability. The results
in these two chapters demonstrate that in order to correctly assess the relation between
the number of veto players and policy stability, one needs to account for accountability
relations and informational structures in place. Chapter 4 presents a novel criticism
to the existing literature in general. I argue that the conventional way to count veto
players in a polity, which only includes domestic players, may no longer be valid. As
democratization and globalization gains speed around the world, political systems get
more complicated and more participatory,. In many policy areas now, the consensus
that is required for a policy change includes not only domestic parties to the decision
but also foreign countries, international organizations, etc. Chapter 4 identies one
such newly emerging external veto player, the EU. EU membership implies transfer
of competencies to the supranational EU level in certain policy areas, or in veto play-
ers jargon, introduces the EU as a new and external veto player in certain domestic
policy areas in member countries. Chapter 4 demonstrates that this introduction has
signicant e¤ects on the political outcomes in member countries ,and thus implies the
incompleteness of analyses that fail to account for such new and external veto players.
As I have already argued the veto players literature has yet to touch upon some im-
portant aspects of political life and thus, there remains important gaps in the literature.
The strategic interaction among veto players in political environments of asymmetric
information, the e¤ects of introducing new veto players to existing political systems,
and the e¤ects of possible accountability relations between veto players and third par-
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ties are yet to be explored. Nevertheless, these studies, with their focus on di¤erent
political systems, and their use of di¤erent research methods, demonstrate the wide ap-
plicability and generalizability of the veto players approach, and suggest that the gaps
will not be there for long. This dissertation aims to contribute to the closing of those
gaps in the literature while drawing upon specic examples from Turkish politics. The
contribution, in that sense, is fourfold: lling out the gaps in the veto players literature;
furthering our understanding of Turkish politics; proving that Turkish politics is a po-
litical system that can be studied and understood within the general frameworks and
theories of political science; and nally attracting scholarly interest to Turkish politics
by demonstrating how it can be a lucrative ground for political science research.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
In the second chapter, I focus on the fact that veto players in a political system
are either elected or appointed, and thus are usually accountable to those who elect
or appoint them, which is a factor that the veto players literature has yet to take into
account. I study the e¤ects of these accountability relations on policy outcomes, and
demonstrate that when coupled with the interactions among veto players, these ac-
countability relations a¤ect the timing of policy decisions and may in some cases even
result in a paralysis of the government in certain policy areas. I construct a simple
spatial model to analyze the policy choice problem of an incumbent party. The party,
by choosing a policy alternative in a one-dimensional policy space, tries to maximize
her expected support. In her choice she is constrained by the preferences of her con-
stituency and the preferences of other veto holders in the political arena. As long as
the preferences of the constituency and the other veto holders match, the incumbent
sails smoothly by taking side with them. But as these preferences start deviating from
each other, the incumbents life gets harder as she gets torn between her constituency
and the probability of a veto that would damage her standing. My analysis indicates
when this trade-o¤ results in policy change and when it will lead to inaction. We see
that inaction is possible if the incumbent thinks that there is no policy alternative that
would please her constituency, and the veto holders so that they would not exercise
their veto rights. The motivating example in this chapter is the AKP governments
policy attitude towards the role of religion in public life, and specically the turban
issue in Turkey. More specically, I argue that the model can help us understand why
the AKP government remained inactive in terms of lifting the ban on turban in public
spaces in their rst term, and why they decided to act on this issue during their second
term.
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In the third chapter, I focus on the role information plays in the interaction among
veto players, and study the e¤ects of informational asymmetries on political outcomes. I
turn to linkage politics and develop a game theoretical model that explains how the exis-
tence of domestic veto players can obstruct international cooperation through studying
a model that demonstrates how an international agreement signed by representatives
of two countries can fail parliamentary ratication. I study a scenario in which the
executives of two countries bargain on a cooperative agreement to replace the existing
state of a¤airs between them. The agreement comes into e¤ect only if it gets ratied
by the parliaments in the two countries. One of the executives lacks information about
parliamentary preferences in her country. I allow communication between agents and
show that under certain assumptions, the informational deciency is incurable due to
incentives to misrepresent preferences. Thus, there is a positive probability that the
international agreement will fail ratication. I also show that a parliament whose ma-
jority is more hawkish than their executive towards cooperation with the other country
prefers to be represented by a risk averse executive in the international bargain rather
than a risk neutral one. My motivating example for this chapter is the ratication fail-
ure of the military cooperation agreement between Turkey and the USA in the Turkish
parliament on March 1st, 2003. I argue that the Turkish executives su¤ered from infor-
mational deciencies in terms of domestic parliamentary preferences. Then the model
demonstrates how these deciencies can lead to the observed ratication failure.
In chapter 4, I focus on the nal gap I have identied in the literature. I argue
that in certain policy areas the set of relevant veto players may include foreign actors
as well as domestic ones, and analyze how the emergence and the existence of these
new players inuence political decision making and the resulting policies while con-
tinuing my focus on linkage politics. My argument in this chapter is that increased
interdependence among countries, either through international organization member-
ship or through economic interdependence, introduces new and outsider veto players to
polities. The introduction of these new veto players brings in new information to the
attention of the domestic constituency who then change their behavior accordingly. In
other words, once they expect their political decision makers to be inuenced by inter-
national organizations or decision makers from other polities, domestic constituencies
adjust the way they reveal their preferences accordingly.
Recent political developments provide a fertile observation ground for the validity
of these arguments. The recent discussion of democratic decit in the European Union,
for example, is about concerns that the policy making in member countries have be-
come too detached from the public (Eriksen and Fossum, 2002). One may argue that
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such a detachment may create a backlash in member state publics and lead them to
take actions in terms of declaring anti-EU preferences to neutralize the EU e¤ect on
their policy decisions. Another interesting example presents itself in Turkish politics;
many observers argue that Islamic fundamentalism can not be a threat to the secular
system in Turkey as long as the country stays on its EU candidacy track. In other
words, then EU acts as a veto player and narrows down the policy space by ruling out
certain conservative policies. One can then expect voters to evaluate parties within this
narrowed down policy space. Seen from this perspective, it is not surprising that the
conservative AKP receives votes from liberal voters as well as conservatives. A rational,
liberal voter might vote for the AKP if she thinks extreme conservative policies will be
vetoed by the EU ruling out the danger that the resulting policies will be too far from
her own ideal. An actual example of such a veto by the EU took place in Austria in
2000. The right-wing extremist Jorg Haider had to step down from his party leadership
when the EU member countries protested and sanctioned his partys coming to power
as a member of the ruling coalition. How this external veto a¤ected the behavior of
Austrian voters is a question that we will be able to answer based on the ndings of
the analyses in this chapter.
A similar e¤ect can be found in the domestic politics of developing countries that
sign stand-by agreements with the IMF. These agreements usually impose harsh aus-
terity measures on the debtor country. These measures limit government spending in
order to balance the budget and pay outstanding debts, which usually mean no or very
low increase in salaries for public workers, little public investment, a cut down in agri-
cultural subsidies, etc..The governments receive transfers from the IMF in return for
compliance with these austerity measures but these transfers usually do not compen-
sate those that the austerity measures hurt the most. And those people make up an
important part of the electorate. It is then only rational to expect these people to vote
for candidates that are opposed to dealing with the IMF. This, for example, might be
one explanation for the electoral success of the extreme right in Turkey in the last ten
years.
I develop a simple voting model in which voters are aware that once elected, the
governing party is bound to negotiate with the other veto players in the political sys-
tem. Thus they base their choices not only upon the revealed positions of contesting
parties but also upon the actual policy that is expected to result from negotiations
among veto players. These veto players might be domestic and/or international due
to an international organization membership, or due to being part to an international
agreement. In other words, voters anticipate a post-election bargain among the relevant
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veto players, and form expectations about the result of this bargain in terms of policy
outcomes. They then vote based on their newly formed expectations. My motivating
example in this chapter is the EU integration as a result of which the EU becomes a new
veto player in member countries. It has been argued in the literature that the EU as a
new veto player, creates a centrist pull on nal policy outcomes in certain policy areas
(Hix, 2003). In other words, in member countries, the EU can be considered as a new
veto player with centrist policy preferences. If this is the case, and if voters are con-
cerned about nal policy outcomes, then we can expect voters in EU member countries
to take into account this centrist pull the EU will exert on policy outcomes, and alter
their vote choices accordingly. I try to empirically verify this argument by analyzing
data from the 2001 British Election Study. In line with the above arguments I have
made, I develop and test three hypotheses about how EU membership alters peoples
voting behavior by imposing constraints on domestic policy making. Note that the EU
example is not directly from Turkish politics but it is highly relevant and applicable to
Turkey since Turkey is now a candidate country.
Finally, in chapter ve, I present a summary of my ndings and conclude with
future research ideas.
The chapters of the dissertation are shaped in such a way that they stand on their
own as separate contributions but seen together as a whole they contribute to the overall
veto players approach.
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CHAPTER 2
A SPATIAL MODEL OF INACTION: THE AKP CASE
2.1 Introduction
The November 2002 general elections in Turkey resulted with the landslide victory
of a then newly founded, pro-Islamist, Justice and Development Party(AKP). The
AKP won the majority of seats in the parliament with 34.3% of the votes and formed a
single-party government. Having the majority of the seats in the parliament enabled the
AKP government to work with relative ease. The number of new legislations adopted
only in their rst two years exceeded some ve hundred. In light of their accomplish-
ments some even called the AKP governments performance a quiet revolution(Tepe,
2005). But interestingly enough the AKP government was not equally active and de-
cisive in all policy areas, to the extent that they even steered away from some. (Tepe,
2005) The one area in which the AKP government had not been as active and decisive
during their rst tenure, despite the partys pro-Islamist roots and stance, was the role
of religion in politics and public life. This area includes the very sensitive issues like
the ban on headscarf in public spaces and the status of religious schools for chaplains
and preachers (·Imam Hatip Okullar¬). The lack of action on the AKP governments
part in this policy area is all the more interesting since, as argued by Çarkoglu and
Hinich (2007), the secularist versus pro-Islamist divide has become the dominant cleav-
age in the Turkish political arena. The authors argue that Turkish votersconception
of their political self and of political parties are mostly shaped by their degree of reli-
giosity and the degree of their desire to see religion playing a role in public life. Thus,
the issues that the AKP government neglected are highly salient to the pro-Islamist
voters who constitute the core constituency of the AKP (Çarkoglu, 2002a). Naturally
the core constituency expected their party to represent their concerns (Tank, 2005).
Nonetheless, during their rst tenure, the AKP government avoided open conicts and
ideological statements in this area, let alone coming up with new policies. It was not
until after the 2007 general elections, which kept the party in power with 47% of the
votes, that the AKP government decided to act on these issues and passed a legislation
that was designed to change the constitution to enable female college students to wear
headscarfs to school. The legislation caused heated debates and was fervently opposed
by the major opposition party members in the parliament. These legislators appealed
to the Constitutional Court which then found the turbanlegislationunconstitutional.
Hence the new legislation never came into e¤ect.
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Why did the AKP government remain inactive in such a highly salient policy area
during their rst tenure and then decide on acting during their second only to be
declared unconstitutional? What kind of factors did determine the contents and the
timing of policy change? In this article, I try to answer these questions from a rational
choice perspective. I start by asking how an incumbent with enough seats to pass
legislation can remain inactive in a policy area that is highly salient for its constituency,
and what determines the timing of policy change. I rst argue that political decisions
can best be understood by studying those actors with the power to veto those decisions,
in other words, by studying the veto players in the system. Then, I demonstrate that
the timing and the contents of policy change depend on the preferences of the relevant
veto players. I show that the existence of a veto player, may even result in a paralysis
of the government in certain policy areas if the preferences of the veto player and the
government diverge su¢ ciently from each other. Moreover, my analysis reveals that the
amount of information veto players have about each others preferences plays a crucial
role in policy formulation.
In the following section, I discuss my approach,and how it can be applied to the
questions at hand in more detail. Then in Section 2.3, I construct a simple spatial model
to analyze the policy making problem of an incumbent government who is constrained in
its choice due to incongruence between the preferences of its core constituency and the
preferences of a veto player. In Section 2.4, I analyze my model and conduct sensitivity
analyses on the results. I conclude in Section 2.5.
2.2 Veto Players
Tsebelis (1995, p.289) denes veto players as individuals or collective actors whose
agreement is required for a change of the status quo. Consequently, he argues that
policy change can only be seen if there exist alternative policies that all the veto players
prefer to the status quo. He calls the set of policies that a veto player prefers to the
status quo the win setof that veto player. Then, the status quo can be replaced only
if the intersection of the winsets of veto players is nonempty. Tsebelis identies the
number of and the ideological distance among the veto players as the main determinants
of this intersection set, and empirically tests his arguments about the inverse relation
between these two factors and the potential for policy change. Since Tsebelis assumes
that the veto players are perfectly informed about each others preferences, inaction is
observed only when the winsets of relevant veto holders are empty. Moreover, unless
being vetoed gives some positive payo¤ to the government, we do not see an actual veto
in his model.
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The identity and number of veto players change from polity to polity. Usually,
veto holders are explicitly specied by the constitution of the country. In presidential
systems, the president is usually a veto player. In bicameralism, each chamber can hold
a veto against the decisions of the other. In multipartyism, the opposition party or the
coalition partners, depending on the number of seats they have in the parliament, might
hold a veto against government proposals. Depending on the constitutional denition
of her functions, a president in a parliamentary system can hold veto power. If exists,
a constitutional court or a supreme court acts as a veto player.
There may also be other veto players in a system, whose veto powers are not explic-
itly and formally dened in the constitution but who exercise this power nonetheless.
For example, strong interest groups can play a veto player role depending on the issue.
More commonly, in many Latin American countries and in Turkey as well, the army
has been an important veto holder. In this sense, military coups can be considered as
extreme cases where the army exercises its veto against government policies.
The strong, secular state establishment, with the army as its guardian, constitutes
the main veto player in Turkey, especially so with respect to issues like the unitary
and secular nature of the state. A political crisis that took place in February 1997
provides one the most recent and clear examples of the veto power this player holds
against the governments policy choices. During the National Security Council meeting
that took place on February 28th, 1997, the generals voiced their criticisms of the
incumbent government. Their criticisms were mostly about the policies of the junior,
pro-Islamist partner of the coalition. These policies were considered to be anti-secular
by the military. The generals listed their objections and the necessary policy changes.
The events that followed led to the collapse of the government and the closure of the
pro-Islamist partner of the coalition by the Constitutional Court on the basis of its
anti-secular activities (Çarko¼glu, 2002a).
The RP leadership then formed a new party under the name of the Virtue Party
(FP), but FP was also closed down by the Constitutional Court in June 2001 on similar
grounds. This time, the pro-Islamist movement experienced a leadership crisis. The
old generation formed the Felicity Party (SP), whereas and the younger ranks of the
movement founded the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in August 2002 under the
leadership of the former Istanbul mayor, Tayyip Erdo¼gan. Erdo¼gan was actually banned
from politics at the time on grounds of inciting religious hatred. AKP participated
in the 2002 elections under Erdo¼gans leadership, and won a land-slide victory. To
understand AKPs electoral success, it is necessary to consider the developments that
took place after the 1999 general elections. The 1999 elections resulted in the formation
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of a coalition government formed by the centre-left DSP, the centre-right ANAP, and
the extreme-right MHP. Unfortunately, hard times were about to come. Two major
earthquakes hit the country in the rst six months of the new government. The coalition
proved clumsy in responding to these disasters and lost considerable public support.
But the nal blow came with the 2001 nancial crisis which resulted in unprecedented
urban unemployment and a record depreciation of the Turkish lira against all foreign
currencies. Çarko¼glu (2002a) argues that together with the August 1999 earthquake, the
devastating impact of the economic crises seems to have been reected in the political
arena in the form of disturbingly deep alienation from the current political parties.
It was against this political, economic, and social background that the AKP rised to
power.
With yet another pro-Islamist party in power, the question became whether the
tensions that gave rise to the February 1997 crisis would be prevalent again, and whether
the AKP government would try to undo the policy changes that came with the crisis.
As I have already argued in the Introduction, these changes included issues like the
ban on headscarf in public spaces and the status of religious schools for chaplains and
preachers (·Imam Hatip Okullar¬), which were highly salient to the pro-Islamist voters
who constitute the core constituency of the AKP (Çarkoglu, 2002a). Naturally the core
constituency expected their party to represent their concerns (Tank, 2005).
Heper (2005) argues that the military and the AKP government have developed
a working relationship. But he also adds that the military is still a robust guardian
of secularism and that there is still suspicion on the part of the state establishment
that the AKP is engaged in dissimulation and sooner or later it will try to resort to
political Islam. Thus the AKP government has an e¤ective constraint on its policy
decisions; the watchful eyes of the guardians who are already suspicious and who made
it public knowledge that they have limited tolerance to moves away from their preferred
position on this particular dimension in question. Çarko¼glu (2002) talks about the
resistance and scepticism on the part of the secularist state establishment towards the
pro-Islamist roots of the AKP. He claims that it will be this very tension between
the AKP government and the secularist establishment that will shape the future of
the country. Similarly Tank (2005) analyzes this very tension, and claims that the
AKP government walks a tight boundary between what is acceptable and what is
unacceptable in the sphere of secularism while, at the same time, trying not to alienate
its core constituency. The problem is appeasing one side enough so as not to be
removed from power while satisfying the other enough to remain in power (Tank,
2005, p.16). It is a risky job in the sense that not only there is the risk of getting into a
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conict with the state establishment, but also, any policy that the AKP promises but
fails to do diminishes the partys credibility in the eyes of voters.
Note that one can explain the observed inaction of the AKP government during
their rst tenure by following Tsebelismodel and by arguing that the intersection of
winsets of the government, and the military must be empty in certain political domains.
When the intersection of these winsets are empty, the status quo remains unchanged
since any alternative policy that the government proposes gets vetoed by the military.
But interestingly, Tsebelismodel fails to explain the subsequent veto that the AKP
government su¤ered. Why would a government, with the information that the winset of
veto players is empty in some certain policy area, attempt to change the status quo in
that area only to be thwarted by a veto? There must be some important factor at work
that was left out in Tsebelismodel. This article argues that the important factor that
was left out is information. In the following sections, I rst argue that the government
may lack information about the preferences of veto players. Then, I demonstrate that
informational asymmetries may account for the observed puzzling events.
2.3 The Model
I construct a simple spatial model to analyze the policy choice problem of an incum-
bent party (which, hereafter, will be referred to as the government). The government,
by choosing a policy alternative in a one-dimensional policy space, tries to maximize
its expected support. In its choice, the government is constrained by the preferences of
its core constituency, and the preferences of a veto player who has the power to veto
the governments policy decisions. As long as the preferences of the constituency and
the veto player match, the government sails smoothly by taking side with them. But as
these preferences start deviating from each other, the governments life gets harder as it
gets torn between its constituency and the probability of a veto that would damage its
political standing. Exercising a veto is a costly business for the veto player. But those
costs are private information to the veto player herself. The government has a certain
belief about how costly it would be for the veto player to exercise her veto right. Based
on its belief about veto costs, the government decides whether to replace the status quo
with a policy that would better please its constituency or remain inactive and leave
the status quo policy in e¤ect. As the government bases its decision on a probabilistic
assessment of veto costs, in cases where it decides to replace the status quo, there is
always a risk that the new policy will su¤er a veto. Similarly, inaction is possible if
the government thinks that there is no policy alternative that would please both its
constituency, and the veto holder so that she would not exercise her veto rights. To
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summarize, we have a government who is to make a policy choice, and a veto player
who is to decide whether to approve or veto the governments choice. The governments
major concern is to please its core constituency so that they keep supporting the gov-
ernment. Once the government decides on the policy, the veto player decides whether
to approve or veto this decision. Her decision is based on her own policy preferences,
and the costs of issuing a veto.
I model this policy making problem using a spatial model a la Hotelling (1929).
- 
xy The role of religion
in public life
Figure 2.1: Policy x corresponds to a higher role of religion in public life than y does.
Policy Space. The one-dimensional policy space depicted in Figure 2.1 denotes a
scale, which I take to be the real line, <, that measures the role of religion in public
life. The policy space can refer to any other policy area. I use the role of religion in
public life to continue with my original example. I will hereafter use the term policy to
refer to a point on this space. A policy x 2 < that promotes a more signicant role for
religion than an alternative policy y 2 < corresponds to a point that is further to the
right than its alternative, that is x > y.
Status Quo. There is a status quo policy in place which corresponds to a point on
our unidimensional policy space and is denoted by q 2 <.
The Government. There is a one-party government in place with enough seats in the
parliament to pass legislation. The governments problem is to choose a policy x that
will please its core constituency and thus, minimize, or if possible, avoid any loss of
support. But in its choice it is constrained by the possibility of a veto. If its choice gets
vetoed then the status quo policy remains in e¤ect. We will discuss the maximization
problem of the government in more detail in the next section.
Veto Player. We have a political actor in the system with the power to veto the
governments policy decisions. The veto player evaluates governments policy decisions
based on her own preferences on the issue, and decides whether to veto them or not. I
assume that the veto player has a most preferred policy, v 2 <; and for any x; y 2 <,
she prefers x to y if x is closer to her ideal policy than y is. More specically, the utility
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the veto player gets from a policy x is
Uv(x) =   jx  vj
If a policy decision is vetoed, then it never comes into e¤ect, and the status quo policy
that was in e¤ect before the policy decision was made continues to be so. There is a cost
associated with exercising a veto. Several reasons might be argued for why a veto should
bear costs for the issuer. First of all, it might be di¢ cult for any veto player to show
open resistance to civilian decisions when these are taken through legitimate democratic
procedures and rests on consensual politics (Toprak, 2005, p.172-179; Lijphart, 1999).
In other words the more a policy is supported by the people the more reluctant the veto
player will be to veto that policy, and the more a policy is contested by people the more
likely that it will be vetoed. This can be observed in the February 1997 crisis in Turkey.
Many argue that if it was not for the large segment of people who were against the pro-
Islamist parties policies of the government in 1997, the military would not be as decisive
as it was in its veto. Similarly, depending on the preferences of the public, a veto might
result in loss of popularity, and damage the public support the veto player enjoys. It
might even be considered, in some cases, undemocratic (albeit constitutional) if the
vetoed policy is highly desired by the public. In such cases, the countrys democratic
image might be harmed which then might hurt its relations with the outside world. A
veto player that exercises her right frequently loses credibility and leads the way for
her own demise since those who want policy change would then maneuver to limit her
powers. In short, the veto player incurs some costs each time she exercises her veto
powers. Once again Turkish politics is ripe with examples of such maneuvers. For
example, the closure of several pro-Islamist parties by the Constitutional Court in the
past, has recently led the AKP government to propose a constitutional change. The
proposal was to give the parliament the authority to decide whether a party closure case
is valid and whether the case merits the consideration of the Constitutional Court (BBC,
April 22, 2010). Clearly, the proposal was designed to curtail the Courts authority.
Let c then denote the costs associated with vetoing a policy. Then, faced with a
policy decision by the government that replaces the status quo policy q by a policy x;
the veto player gets Uv(x) if she approves x, and she gets Uv(q)  c if she issues a veto.
Thus, the veto player vetoes policy x if
Uv(q)  c > Uv(x)
Core Constituency. The core constituency consists of voters whose interests the
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governing party set out to represent in the rst place. In the AKP case, for example,
the core constituency is the right-wing, conservative, pro-Islamist voters. The governing
party gives the highest importance to the preferences of the core constituency while
formulating new policies. Similar to the veto player, (i) the core constituency also has
preferences on the role that religion plays in public life according to which they evaluate
government policies, and (ii) the result of their evaluation a¤ects their support of the
government. To represent these two features, I assume that (i) the core constituency
has a most preferred point, r, on the scale in Figure 2.1, (ii) the core constituency fully
supports a government that enacts r; but as the government policy deviates further
from r; the support that the core constituency gives to the government declines. I
assume that the loss of support due to a policy x is a linear function of the distance
between x and r. More specically, it is of the form
loss of support =  jr   xj
where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that measures the core constituencys sensitivity to a
deviation from r. Finally, in line with our motivating example, I assume that the core
constituency of the governing party prefers religion to have a more signicant role in
public life than does the veto player, that is, v < r. Without loss of generality, I
assume that v = 0, and r = 1:
2.4 The Analysis
The Governments Problem. As stated above, the governments problem is to
choose a policy that would maximize its support, while not evoking a veto. We know
that, a policy x 2 < gets vetoed if Uv(q)   Uv(x) > c: As I have argued above, c
depends on things like how salient the issue is for the veto player, the popularity and
the credibility of the veto player amongst the public, how a veto might a¤ect the
political situation in the country, the veto players relations and standing with the
other relevant actors, how a veto might a¤ect the countrys image in the outside world,
and how important that image is for the veto player, etc. Note that di¤erent actors
might evaluate these factor di¤erently, and it is highly likely that those evaluations are
private information to the actors themselves. In other words, the government may not
have complete information about how costly it would be for the veto player to veto a
policy. Having said that, it is also not realistic either to think that the government
would be in complete darkness about veto costs. It is, however, reasonable to assume
that the government has some probabilistic belief about the costs that a veto player
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would incur if she were to veto a policy in a certain issue area, given the status quo
and the preferences of other relevant actors. In accordance with this line of thinking,
I assume that c is a uniformly distributed random variable, with distribution function
G, density function g; and domain C: Exercising a veto is always costly, which means
G(0) = 0: I also assume that a veto can not be innitely costly, that is, C is some
closed interval [0; c] where c is nite. Given that c is uniformly distributed on C; let
p(x) denote the governments belief about the probability that policy x will be vetoed.
Then , p(x) must be consistent with the way the veto player is expected to act, and the
distribution of veto costs, that is,
p(x) =

0 if Uv(q)  Uv(x)  0
G(Uv(q)  Uv(x)) if Uv(q)  Uv(x) > 0
Note that v = 0 implies Uv(q)  Uv(x) =   jq   vj   jx  vj = jxj   jqj ;then we can
rewrite p(x) as
p(x) =

0 if jxj  jqj
G(jxj   jqj) if jxj > jqj (2.4.1)
With the probability of veto at hand, the government, solves the following maximization
problem:
max
x2<
(1  p(x))(1   j1  xj)
which can be interpreted as maximizing its expected support. Note that (1 s(x)) gives
the support the government will get by enacting policy x: But x can be enacted only
if it does not get vetoed. the probability that x will not be vetoed is (1   p(x))Thus,
(1  p(x))(1  s(x)) gives us the expected support the government gets from choosing
policy x:
One important thing to note is that the optimal policy x can not lay outside
the [v; r] interval. To see why, suppose x < v. Then by moving a little to the
right, the government increases its expected support as it is now closer to both its core
constituencys and the veto players preferred points. For this reason, no x < v can
be an optimal policy. Now alternatively suppose x > r. Similarly, by moving a little
to the left, the government can increase its expected support. Thus, no x > r can be
an optimal policy.
We can, then, rewrite the governments maximization problem as
max
x2[0;1]
(1  p(x))(1  (1  x))
Note that, the solution to the governments choice problem depends on where the
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status quo policy is on our policy continuum. Let us rst consider the possible scenarios
and governments choice problem under each of these scenarios.
Scenario 1: 1  q. The government has the best of the worlds under this scenario
as it can enact x = 1 without fearing a veto. x = 1 ensures that the government does
not lose any core support, and it has zero probability of being vetoed as it stands closer
to the ideal policy of the veto player than the status quo does.
Scenario 2: q <  1: Under this scenario, the government can and will enact
x = 1 without any fear of a veto since for x = 1; jxj  jqj ; and thus p(1) = 0:
Scenario 3:  1  q  0: The government can enact any policy within [q; q]
without any fear of a veto since for any x 2 [q; q]; jxj  jqj. And within this interval,
it gets the highest expected support from enacting  q as it is the closest one to r:
Outside this interval, the government faces a trade o¤ between higher support and
the risk of su¤ering a veto. Thus, the governments problem in this scenario can be
rewritten as
max
x2[ q;1]
(1  p(x))(1  (1  x))
Scenario 4: 0 < q < 1:Under this scenario, the government will not enact anything
to the left of q as that would be worse than leaving the status quo policy in place. Thus,
we can rewrite the governments problem under this scenario as
max
x2[q;1]
(1  p(x))(1  (1  x))
Note that the government faces a trade o¤ only under Scenario 3 and Scenario 4, and
the maximization problems under these scenarios are very similar. I will focus on these
two scenarios, and without loss of generality, I will simply assume that q = 0; that is, the
status quo policy is the ideal policy of the veto player. Note that this nal assumption
is only for the sake of notational ease and does not a¤ect the results otherwise.
-  
q = v = 0 r = 1
Figure 2.2: The government, facing q = v = 0 and r = 1, is to choose a policy x.
With q = 0 and x 2 [q; 1], we have p(x) = G(x) = x
c
(2:4:1): We can then rewrite
the governments maximization problem as
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max
x2[0;1]
Ugov(x) = (1 G(x))(1  ((1  x)). (2.4.2)
The rst and the second order conditions for the above maximization problem are
respectively
@Ugov(x)
@x
=   G0(x) + G0(x)  G(x)  xG0(x) =    1
c
+

c
  2x
c
= 0 (2.4.3)
and
@2Ugov(x)
@x2
=
 2
c
< 0.
Solving Equation (2:4:3), we obtain
x =
c+    1
2
(2.4.4)
Since 0  x  1; it must be that
0  c+    1
2
 1
which implies
1  

 c  1 + 

(2.4.5)
For any (c; ) pair that violates these inequalities, the maximization problem in
Equation (2:4:2) results in a corner-point solution. Particularly, for c < 1 

; the optimal
policy remains to be the preferred point of the veto player as the cost of a veto can not
be high enough to preclude a veto. Similarly, for 1+

< c; the optimal policy becomes
the preferred point of the core constituency since exercising a veto would be too costly
for the veto player. Note that, the uncertainty on the governments part is not about
c; but about the actual value of c in the [0; c] interval.
To summarize, the optimal policy choice x that maximizes the governments
expected support can be written as
x =
8><>:
c+ 1
2
for 1 

 c  1+

,
0 for c < 1 

,
1 for 1+

< c.
(2.4.6)
2.4.1 E¤ect of a Change in Policy Sensitivities and Veto Costs on x Equation (2:4:6)
reveals that the optimal policy x depends on the policy sensitivity of the core con-
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stituency and how costly it might be for the veto player to exercise her veto rights. One
way to gain further insight into the governments problem is to look at how x reacts
to changes in these two parameters.
Change in veto costs. The derivative of Equation (2:4:4) with respect to c;
@x
@c
=
1
2
> 0;
gives us the e¤ect of a change in c on the optimal policy choice of the government. That
is, as higher veto costs become possible the optimal policy choice of government moves
towards the core constituencys most preferred point. Figure 2:3 below demonstrates
this point for three alternative values of c.
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Figure 2.3: Fixing  = 0:5, the gure shows three versions of the expected support
function Ugov(x). For c = 1:5, x = 0:25; for c = 2, x = 0:5; for c = 2:5, x = 0:75.
Change in the policy sensitivity of the core constituency. The derivative of
Equation (2:4:4) with respect to ;
@x
@
=
1
22
> 0;
shows that an increase in the core constituencys policy sensitivity moves the optimal
policy choice of the government towards the core constituencys most preferred point.
Figure 2:4 below demonstrates this point for three alternative values of .
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Figure 2.4: Fixing c = 2, the gure shows three versions of the expected support
function Ugov(x). For  = 0:37, x = 0:15; for  = 0:5, x = 0:5; and for  = 0:67,
x = 0:75.
2.4.2 Possibility of Inaction The above analysis reveals that for certain combinations
of  and c, the governments optimal policy choice x is simply the status quo. More
specically, for combinations of  and c such that c  1 

; x = 0:Faced with those
parameter values, the government remains inactive.
Figure 2.5 partitions the two-dimensional parameter space into zones of action and
inaction, and demonstrates the (c; ) pairs under which the government would enact
a new policy to replace the status quo, and those pairs under which it will remain
inactive.
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Figure 2.5: The partitioning of the parameter space.
Note that given a policy x, the governments assessment of the probability that the
veto player is going to veto x decreases as c increases. As a result, the government
prefers to replace the status quo with a policy that better suits to the wishes of the
core constituency even when the issue is not too salient for the core constituency. For
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example, we can see in Figure 2:5 above that for c = 3, the government prefers to take
an action for all  values greater than 0:25:
To summarize, the above analysis identies two parameters that are important in
the governments decision; the policy sensitivity of the governments core constituency,
, and the governments belief about the how costly it might be for the veto player to
veto a policy in this issue area.
In turn, these parameters are determined by the political environment. In a political
environment where there exists other ideologically similar political parties which may
appeal to the core constituency of the incumbent party, we can expect to see high values
of . These other parties enable the voters to switch parties without betraying their
ideology if the governing party fails their expectations. In our original example, one
can argue, in light of the lack of trust the voters had declared on occasion for other
parties and leaders before the 2002 elections, that there was not a strong alternative to
the AKP, which implies a low . Çarko¼glu (2002a) discusses how deeply the Turkish
voters were alienated from existing political parties before the 2002 general elections as
a result of the economic crises and the 1999 earthquake, which also indicates that the
voters did not see a strong alternative to the AKP. This in turn implies that inaction
could have been optimal during the rst tenure of the AKP government as the party
knew that its core constituency lacked political alternatives.
Similarly, one may argue that  depends on how salient the issue is to the core
constituency and expect it to go down as the issue becomes less salient. When the
AKP took hold of the government in 2002, the country was just recovering from one
of its worst economic crisis. Çarko¼glu (2002a) argues that The fact that none of the
incumbent coalition partners could reach the ten per cent electoral threshold required
to gain parliamentary representation indicates the great importance attached by voters
to the devastating impact of the recent economic crisis on their personal lives(p.132).
Thus, issues about economic recovery were the most salient ones in everyones regard.
This again implies that inaction could have been optimal during the rst tenure of the
AKP government as the party was aware that there were more urgent issues to tackle.
Actually, party leadership made a point of mentioning in their rst declaration after the
elections that the headscarf issue did not have a priority on their to do list (Hürriyet,
November 4, 2002). Interestingly, it is also possible to track down how the saliency of
the turban issue has changed over time for the AKP constituency from various survey
studies conducted in the 2000s. Paradoxically, the evidence suggests that the issue lost
some saliency during the rst tenure of the AKP government. Çarko¼glu and Toprak
(2006) report that although the percentage of those respondents who think that there
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is oppression of religious people in Turkey declined from 2002 to 2006, the percentage
of those among them who thought of the turban ban in schools and public o¢ ces as
the major example of that oppression remained more or less the same ,which means in
total, the percentage of those who see the turban ban as an oppression against religious
people declined over the period. Thus, AKPs decision to make a move during their
second tenure was most probably not due to an increase in the saliency of the issue.
The existence of other clientelistic ties between the party and the core constituency
might also reect on . These other ties might make the core constituency less sensitive
to policy in this specic area, reducing . Referring to the 2006 survey study by
Çarko¼glu and Toprak (2006) again, we see that a large majority of respondents nd the
AKP very successful in terms of providing perks to its supporters (like employment in
public service, attending to problems they may have with the state bureaucracy, etc...).
 can also depend on how informed the core constituency is about the institutional
structure of their polity, and about the preferences of the relevant veto players in that
structure. In a polity where the core constituency is aware that there exists a veto
player who would veto policy moves towards their ideal, the core constituency might
hold the veto player responsible for their frustration, thus, we might expect to see a
low . Moreover, the government might try to escape responsibility by blaming the
veto player for the frustration of its core constituency. If the government succeeds
in its e¤orts to shift the blame then we might expect to see a low . This might
actually be one of the important factors behind AKPs timing of policy choice. One
can argue that given the events of February 1997, and the following party closures in
1998, during AKPs rst tenure, its core constituency was aware that a relevant veto
player was against lifting the ban on turban, and thus they did not hold the AKP
responsible for the lack of policy change. It is not, however, possible to make a similar
argument for the second tenure of the AKP. Via a constitutional change in 2003, the
AKP government changed the structure of the National Security Council which meant
a change in the preferences of this important veto player. Given that it was made by
the AKP government itself, one can argue that this change most probably brought the
preferences of the Council closer to the AKP constituency. This in turn can explain
why the AKP decided to act on the turban issue in their second tenure rather than in
their rst.
Finally, the policy sensitivity of the core constituency would also increase as the
amount of time the core constituency has waited for a policy change towards their
ideal increases. If the core constituency thinks that they have waited too long for their
expectations to be fullled, we can expect them to have a high . In the case of AKP,
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it might simply be that the party could not keep its core constituency waiting for any
longer.
In an environment where recent history is marked with conict between the veto
player and the government, we can expect the government to believe that the veto
player regards veto costs small compared to the costs of a political surrender: It is
highly likely that the AKP was threading more carefully during its rst tenure not to
create any tensions with the secular state establishment. In light of the political crisis
the country su¤ered in 1997, the AKP knew that religion and its role in public life was
a highly salient issue in the eyes of the major veto holders in the country which means
a very high probability of veto in case policies deviate from the ideals of these veto
players. Similarly, if the issue is salient for the veto player for any other reason, we can
expect c to be small.
The level of public support the veto player enjoys may a¤ect c as well. A veto
player who has high levels of public support is less likely to tolerate deviations from its
preferred policies than a veto player whom the public does not approve of. In Turkey,
the army usually ranks rst in survey studies as the institution people trust the most.
Eurobarometer surveys, for example, reveal the high level of trust Turkish people put in
the army as an institution. Given the public support, and the unyielding laicist stand
of the army, one can then expect c to be small in the Turkish case for policies regarding
the role of religion in public life. Note that, according to the Eurobarometer surveys,
the level of this trust did not really di¤er much between the two tenures of the AKP
government, which indicates that AKPs timing of policy change can not be explained
by a change in the public support the veto player enjoys.
Similarly, c is a¤ected by the percentage of votes the incumbent party receives. An
incumbent party that enjoys high levels of voter support is less likely to see its policies
vetoed by another veto player than a party with marginal support. For our motivating
case this means that the AKP members could have been encouraged by the surge in
their vote share in the 2007 elections. The backing of almost half the voters might have
led the AKP members to think that other veto players would nd it too costly to veto
their policies.
The attitude of the outside world towards the policy issue in question can also be
important in terms of veto costs. If the preferences of the veto player are shared by
important foreign parties, like relevant international institutions, and/or major trade
partners of the country, then it is highly unlikely that those parties would disapprove of
a veto. In such a situation, we might expect c to be low. The fact that Turkey became
an o¢ cial candidate to and started accession negotiations with the European Union in
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late 2005, might also have led the AKP to think that vetoing its policies would now be
too costly for others. The frequent warnings from the EU about democratization, about
human rights, about minimizing the role the army plays in politics, coupled with the
support EU membership receives from prominent economic and political actors with
close ties to the state like the Turkish Industrialists and Businessmens Association
(TUSIAD Bas¬n Bülteni, 29 May¬s 2002), and the main opposition party CHP (CHP
2002 Seçim Bildirgesi), might have led the AKP members to believe that the recurrence
of a February 1997-like intervention is unlikely. Interestingly, considering the Leyla
S¸ahin case of 1995, EU membership might have worked in the opposite way as well,
that is, it might be a better explanation to AKPs inaction during their rst tenure
rather than their taking action during their second. Leyla S¸ahin was a medical student
and she got expelled from school when she insisted on wearing a headscarf to classes.
She sued the Turkish state and took the case to the European Human Rights Court,
but the court rejected her application on two occasions (Turkish Ministry of Justice).
This rejection might have worked as a signal that the EU did not share the policy
preferences of the AKP core constituency in terms of the role of religion in public life,
and that the EU would not interpret vetoing policy changes to increase that role as
undemocratic.
2.5 Conclusion
By the use of a simple spatial model of policy choice I have demonstrated that the
existence of a veto player might a¤ect the nature and timing of policy change and even
render inaction in specic issue areas a rational choice for a government. The model
analyzed so far is a very simplistic version of a governments policy making problem
in one specic area. The government is constrained only by the preferences of its core
constituency and the preferences of a single veto player. In reality there are of course
further complicating factors that exists in the political environment. As I have discussed
before there may be multiple veto players, including coalition partners in the case of
a coalition government and the opposition parties in the parliament depending on the
number of chairs each party holds. Depending on the electoral laws there may be further
complications. Çarko¼glu points to the fact that in the 2002 elections, due to the 10%
threshold, 45% of voters remained unrepresented in the parliament. This implies that
during its rst tenure, the AKPs seat advantage did not translate into a vote majority
in electoral support. Therefore the legitimacy of any legislation that passed without
the support of the other party in the parliament would have been open to questioning.
This potential pressure might have acted as another constraint on the AKP in the sense
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that the AKP needed to build consensus in and also out of the parliament in order to
maintain its legitimacy as a government (Çarko¼glu, 2002, p.34).
A further complication might arise from other informational imperfections. In our
model I assumed that the government only lacks information about veto costs, and
has perfect information about the ideal policies of the core constituency and the veto
player. It might be that the government has only a probabilistic view of these as well.
My model does not allow any communication among players that might alleviate
informational problems. In reality, one would expect the government to communicate
with all other relevant players, especially while formulating a new policy. Once com-
munication is involved, it becomes important whether declarations carry any costs or
not. K¬br¬s argues that in cases where the declarations of players do not a¤ect their
payo¤s, we can expect strategical misrepresentations to the extend that communication
becomes ine¤ective in solving informational problems (K¬br¬s, 2008).
More importantly, the core constituency is probably not the only ones whose sup-
port the government cares about. Depending on the policy area, the government might
be aiming to please groups outside its core constituency, or it might be considering the
support it gets from the whole spectrum of voters rather than just its core constituency.
So,the distribution of ideal points of other voters and their policy sensitivities might
also be important in making a policy decision.
To extend this model to include these further constraints remains a challenging task
and is left for further research.
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CHAPTER 3
UNCERTAINTY AND RATIFICATION FAILURE
3.1 Introduction
On March 1st, 2003, the Turkish parliament voted to turn down a military coop-
eration agreement with the United States. The agreement would have enabled the US
military to deploy 62 thousand American troops through southeastern Turkey to open
a northern front against Saddam Hussein (Yetkin, 2004, Lee, 2003). The ratication
failure was unexpected by both the Turkish and American administrations (Bölükbas¸¬,
2008; Robins, 2003; Rubin, 2005; Kapsis 2006; Hale, 2007; Yetkin, 2004; Mango 2003).
So much so that Turkish ports had already been prepared to receive massive military
deployments, and American military ships carrying 35 thousand American soldiers were
already waiting for deployment o¤ the Eastern Mediterranean coasts of Turkey (Yetkin,
2004). But, it turned out that the Turkish executives brought home a deal that was
not good enough for the majority in the parliament. It included too many American
troops, too few guarantees about the future status of Iraqi Kurds, too little nancial
compensation for expected economic losses, etc. (Pan, 2003). The ratication failure
aroused anger on the U.S. side. It caused the Bush administration to alter its war plans
signicantly at the last minute and according to some commentators, made the whole
campaign a lot more costly (Pan, 2003). On the Turkish side, the executive branch of
the government was trying to minimize the damage by entertaining talks of resubmit-
ting the deal to the parliament. In any case, the damage was done and nobody wanted
to be in the shoes of the Turkish prime minister then.
Interestingly, this was not the rst time that an agreement between the Turkish
and American administrations failed to attract legislative support. The very rst agree-
ment signed between the two states su¤ered the same fate as well. On August 6, 1923,
the American and Turkish representatives at the Lausanne Conference in Switzerland
signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce to establish normal diplomatic and commercial
relations between the United States and the newly founded Turkish Republic. Unfortu-
nately, the treaty failed ratication in the Senate. A majority of senators thought the
State Department had failed to get enough concessions from the Turkish government,
especially in terms of allowances for American intervention for the protection of the
Christian minority in Turkey (Vander Lippe, 1993).
Aside from both being interesting anecdotes from the history of Turkish-American
relations, these two ratication failures share another interesting feature: they were
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both involuntary defections (Putnam, 1988). In other words, the executives who
had signed them had done so with the anticipation that they would be ratied by
their legislatures. The failure of the 1923 agreement was unexpected because no one
expected a simple amity treaty with a newly formed republic 10000 miles away from
the US to be an issue of contention in the Senate. Whereas the second failure that
came 80 years later was unexpected because during those 80 years, the two countries
have become staunch NATO allies. Turkey had supported the U.S. military campaigns
in Korea, and the Gulf War. Moreover, the Turkish executives negotiating the deal
were members of the ruling party, the AKP, which held the majority of seats in the
parliament. The number of votes the AKP had was more than enough to ratify the
agreement. Even more importantly, it was only three weeks before the ratication that
the Turkish parliament passed a resolution to allow the arrival of American advance
guards to modernize Turkish airports and seaports in preparation for massive military
deployments (Yetkin, 2004). The resolution, together with an announcement from the
Turkish National Security Council declaring that Turkey can not stand aloof to the
developments in Iraq, were interpreted as signals by both sides that future cooperation
would follow swiftly. The head of the Turkish negotiating team, Ambassador Deniz
Bölükbas¸¬(2008), who later collected his memoirs in a book, notes how the passage of
this rst resolution on February 6, 2003, misled both sides by creating false expectations:
...The parliament, who allowed all these modernization activities fully
knowing that they are being conducted to meet the needs of American
troops that will be transferred to Turkey for the Iraqi war, rejected, only
after three weeks, the arrival of these troops. This should be taken into
account to fully understand the surprise and the confusion on the Turkish
and American sides. Yes, the Turkish parliament, by allowing the arrival of
American advance guards, created the understandable expectation that it
would allow the arrival of main ghter troops, and thus gave a misleading
signal on February 6, 2003. There is no arguing or denying this.
And he continues to explain in detail the exact miscalculation this misleading signal
caused on the part of the Turkish executives:
(The AKP leader) Erdo¼gan, made a mistake in thinking that the 44 no
votes from the party group in the vote for the February 6th resolution would
be the ceiling for negative votes on March 1st. The number turned out to
be more than twice.1
1Ambassador Deniz Bölükbas¸¬published his memoirs in Turkish. The translations belong to the
author.
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Moreover, the passage of the February 6th resolution was not the only misleading
signal the Turkish executives received. Kapsis (2006) argues that Erdo¼gan also took
a straw poll before the vote, the results of which appeared to bolster Erdo¼gans posi-
tion since only about 50 deputies, about the same number who had voted against the
resolution in February, signaled that they would oppose the measure.
Erdo¼gan knew he didnt need all 361 AKP deputies to vote with him for
the authorization to pass, but he was condent that the authorization would
still pass by a clear margin of close to 50 votes.(Kapsis, 2006)
But in the end 99 AKP member legislators went against their leader and voted no.
Robins (2003) emphasizes that no one expected the motion to fail by arguing that even
the Turkish public, who was largely against the American campaign in Iraq and any
Turkish involvement in it, was expecting the parliament to ignore their wishes. Rubin
(2005) argues that it was because of the disorganization in the AKP that party leaders
were unaware that they did not have the votes to win.
Obviously, the Turkish and American executives brought home deals that were not
good enough for the majority in their legislatures. And they are not the only ones
who made such mistakes. History o¤ers us other examples of involuntary defections as
well. The Danish prime minister Poul Schlüter was not expecting the Single European
Act to fail parliamentary ratication. But it did. And when the Danish parliament
rejected the Act in 1986, he had to call for a referendum to save his minority government
from falling (Worre, 1988). In 1954, the French executives risked a similar humiliation
but they maneuvered to withdraw the European Defence Community Treaty from the
parliamentary agenda when it became obvious that it was destined for a ratication
failure (Miller and Rosendorf, 1997a; Van der Veen, 2009). Similarly, the Clinton
administration tried, and failed, to postpone the Senate ratication of the Nuclear
Weapons Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999, when it became clear during the
Committee hearings that the treaty was short of the votes for approval. And in a
most dramatic case, President Wilson believed that the Senate was bound to ratify the
Versailles Treaty because he did not believe the Senate would dare incur the odium
of committing so dastardly a crime against humanity (Bailey, 1947). And when he
realized how mistaken he had been, he went on a 8000 mile tour of the country and
worked himself to a stroke trying to convince the public and, through the public, the
isolationist senators who found the Versailles Treaty too interventionist, that the treaty
was in the best interests of the American nation (Bailey, 1947). Despite all his e¤orts,
the Senate rejected the Versailles Treaty.
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Involuntary defections are puzzling events. They are puzzling because the executive
negotiating the agreement in the rst place is expected to know and represent the
preferences of her legislature, and bring home an agreement that would be ratied with
no problem. Or conversely, the legislature is expected to exercise enough inuence
over the executive to eliminate the possibility that she would say yes to a domestically
unpalatable deal. It is also politically damaging for a political leader to present to
its parliament an international agreement only to nd that the majority does not nd
it in the best interest of the nation. But the failures I have discussed so far clearly
demonstrate that executives may indeed lack information about domestic preferences.
What is even more interesting is that executives can have these deciencies despite all
the communication that goes on between them and their legislatures.
In this chapter, I develop and study a formal model of ratication to further our
understanding of involuntary defections. I start by arguing that an executive may su¤er
from uncertainty about domestic preferences, and I examine the conditions under which
her uncertainty remains unresolved even in the presence of communication, and lead
to a ratication failure.2 I develop a game theoretical model in which the executives
of two countries bargain on a cooperative agreement to replace the existing state of
a¤airs between them. The agreement comes into e¤ect only if it gets ratied by the
parliaments in the two countries. I assume one of the executives lacks information about
parliamentary preferences in her country. I allow communication between agents, and
I show that under certain assumptions this signalling game has no equilibrium in
which some information transmission is possible. In other words, the communication
between the legislature and the executive is completely devoid of informational value.
This result explains why an executive may not be able to resolve any uncertainty she
may have about domestic preferences via communication and bring home an agreement
only to see it rejected by the legislature.
Having said that, I must emphasize that, my model does not predict ratication
failures in all cases where the executive lacks information about domestic preferences.
It only points out the possibility and demonstrates that communication does not re-
duce the probability of such an outcome. In that sense, the model is applicable to all
international negotiations conducted by executives with less than perfect information
2Admitedly, such scenarios would be more probable in presidential-like systems, or in parliamentary
minority systems like the Nordic countries, or, as the failed Turkish-American military cooperation
agreement of 2003 shows, in parliamentary majority systems where the ruling party has a weak party
discipline, and they are less probable in parliamentary majority systems where the executive power has
a strong parliamentary basis and a strong hold over this basis. For a detailed discussion of the e¤ects
of institutional setup on domestic uncertainty in international negotiation setups please see Reinhardt
(1996).
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about domestic preferences. Evans argues that such executives are more common than
expected (Evans, 1993):
Our mistake was not in overestimating the importance of information:
it was in overestimating the informational consequences of national bound-
aries. Chief of governmentsestimates of what was ratiable in their own
domestic politics were often wrong ... the quality of information within
domestic boundaries was lower than we had expected. Estimates from the
other side of the international table are not always accurate but there is no
evidence in our cases that negotiatorsestimates about their own domestic
tables are substantially more accurate.
Given that the domestic executive is to work under uncertainty, her attitude towards
risk becomes important. Thus, I also inquire whether leaders that di¤er in terms of
their attitude towards risk fare di¤erently in managing international negotiations under
domestic uncertainty. The signing of an international agreement that gets the national
stamp of approval is a political success for a leader. Thus, this chapter examines whether
some leaders, due to their attitudes towards risk, are more likely to be successful than
others in conducting foreign policy when they have to work with limited information
about domestic preferences. It is a well-established result in the bargaining literature
that there is an inverse relation between the degree of risk aversion of a player and her
gains from a bargain (see for example, Kihlstrom, Roth, and Schmeidler 1981).3 In
our context, this negative relation between risk aversion and bargaining gains implies
that, a more risk averse executive is expected to do worse at the international table.
Thus, in a scenario where she had full information about domestic politics, a risk averse
executive would not be ideal to represent the national interest. Interestingly, I nd that
an opposite result holds under incomplete information. A legislature whose majority is
more hawkish than the executive towards cooperation with the foreign country prefers
the executive to be risk averse rather than risk neutral. Moreover, the more hawkish
the legislators the more risk averse they prefer the executive to be.
There are similar bargaining subject to veto by a third agent situations in various
other economic and political areas, which provide further applicability for my model.
3For example, previous research has shown that more risk averse workers are at a disadvantage
when bargaining over wages (Pissarides 1974; Feinberg, 1977). An often cited empirical evidence for
this result is the observed wage di¤erentials between men and women. While a large portion of this
wage gap can be explained by factors that are thought to be correlated with productivity, a substantial
portion of the wage gap remains unexplained (Bayard et.al., 1999; Light and Ureta, 1995; Polachek
and Kim, 1995; Becker and Lindsay, 1995), and researchers tie this unexplained gap to the di¤erences
between men and women in terms of their risk aversion (Vesterlund, 1997) as women are found to be
more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1996).
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One such area is domestic veto-bargaining in presidential bicameral systems where the
president holds a veto over proposed legislation by the chambers. To adopt my model
one only needs to think of the bargainers as legislative chambers bargaining on an
alternative policy to replace the status quo, and the ratier as the president. There is
an extensively rich literature on veto bargaining between a president and her legislature
(for a detailed review of this literature please see Cameron and McCarty 2004, and
Cameron, 2000). And the literature contains some very inuential works which have
argued before that proposers of legislation may lack information about presidential
preferences, and that this deciency might explain presidential vetoes (Cameron, 2000;
McCarty, 1997; Matthews, 1989). Interestingly, most veto-bargaining studies treat the
legislature as unicameral. For their results to be applicable to bicameral systems it
must either be that (i) the chambers are congruent in terms of their policy preferences,
or that (ii) one of them lacks enough leverage to keep the other from acting unilaterally.
However, Heller (2007) argues that congruence should be rare as it is highly unlikely
to have di¤erent chambers with identical preferences as long as legislative chambers
are made up of di¤erent sets of individuals (for a detailed survey of the literature on
bicameralism please see Heller, 2007). Also, condition (ii) fails as long as each chamber
has at the very least a veto over policy. Moreover, Tsebelis and Money (1997) show
that even the ability to delay legislation should yield tangible policy inuence. As a
result, Heller (2007) argues:
The ability to block legislation provides inuence over legislative content.
Bicameralism, like all institutional structures that divide authority, adds
veto players to the policy-making game ... If each chamber in a bicameral
legislature has a unique ideal point, any intercameral policy bargain should
lie on the contract curve between them ...yielding policy that is both a
compromise (hence likely to be relatively moderate) and e¢ cient.
My model o¤ers a way to incorporate bicameralism into studies of veto-bargaining
in domestic policy making. It acknowledges that in bicameral systems (in which the two
chambers have incongruent policy preferences and each has enough leverage to keep the
other from acting unilaterally) the proposed legislation is itself an outcome of an initial
intercameral bargain. My results then point to the possibility of presidential vetoes
in cases where the chambers are uncertain about policy preferences of the president.
More importantly, we know that the possibility can not be abated via communication
between the chambers and the president.
My analysis is also applicable to delegated bargaining situations in which an agent
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conducts a bargain on behalf of a principal. Attorneys, for example, conduct pre-
trial bargains on behalf of their clients who reserve the right to reject the outcome of
the bargain. Litigation models usually analyze the litigation process as a two-player
strategic game of incomplete information between the plainti¤ and the defendant, and
leave out attorneys as players because they assume attorneys and their clients have the
same objectives. However, Watts (1994) argues that an attorney paid by contingency
fee may want to settle a case, even when it is not advantageous to her client, in order
to avoid the cost of preparing for trial. And plainti¤ lawyers are mostly paid by
contingency contracts whereas defendant lawyers are typically paid at hourly rates
(Trubek et al., 1983; Cai, 2000). Hence, pre-trial negotiations can better be depicted
as a bargain between the plainti¤s attorney and the defendant (or his attorney), a
bargain whose outcome is subject to approval by the plainti¤.
Similarly, company executives conduct merger and acquisition bargains on behalf of
their shareholders who, by law, have to approve the nal deal. Stories of failed merger
deals (which usually end with the executive losing her job) indicate that executives may
sometimes fail to anticipate shareholder preferences4. My analysis can also be a used
to better understand such interactions.
The chapter is organized as follows: In the next section, I discuss the related liter-
ature, and how this chapter contributes to it. In Section 3, I develop the ratication
game. In Section 4, I characterize the equilibria of the game. Finally, I conclude in
Section 5 by discussing how my results further our understanding of the questions that
have motivated the chapter.
3.2 The Literature
This chapter contributes to the linkage politics literature which studies the interac-
tions between domestic and foreign politics. Starting with Putnams ground breaking
work, the linkage politics literature have relied on the notion of a two-levelgame in
which an executive is to thread between the domestic politics game table and the inter-
national politics game table (Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Iida
1993; Iida 1996; Mo 1994; Mo 1995; Milner and Rosendorf 1997a,b; Reinhardt 1996).
This two-simultaneously-played-games structure includes three players; the foreign ex-
ecutive, the domestic executive, and the domestic ratier. The executives negotiate an
agreement which is then subject to ratication by the domestic ratier. The domestic
4See for example, the 2001 merger between HP and Compaq which almost failed when some im-
portant shareholders did not like the deal the CEOs agreed upon (The Michigan Daily, Sept.5, 2001).
The failed GM-Magna deal is another example (The Wall Street Journal, Nov.4, 2009).
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ratier is in most cases the legislature, and since ratication of international agreements
is usually done by majority voting, under some standard assumptions the median leg-
islator becomes representative of the whole legislature. The linkage-politics literature
acknowledges various informational asymmetries that may exist among players. The
foreign executive may lack information about the preferences of the domestic ratier,
and may have to work with the information the domestic executive brings to the in-
ternational table (Mo 1994). Alternatively, the domestic ratier may lack information
about the preferences of the foreign and/or domestic executive (Iida, 1993; Milner and
Rosendorf 1997b).
Iida (1996), Milner and Rosendorf (1997a) and Reinhardt (1996) explore a third pos-
sibility, namely that the domestic executive may lack information about the preferences
of the domestic ratier. Iida, who is actually the rst to acknowledge such a possibil-
ity, applies the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to international negotiations, and
demonstrates that an executive with such an informational deciency risks involuntary
defection. He incorporates communication in his model in the form of a pre-negotiation
domestic poll, and he acknowledges the possibility of strategic misrepresentation by leg-
islators. However, he focuses on equilibrium outcomes under truthful revelation. Milner
and Rosendorf (1997a) point to elections that change the composition of the parliament
and that take place after the negotiation but before the ratication of an international
agreement as possible explanation for how an executive can lack ratiability informa-
tion and end up with a ratication failure in her hands. Their model does not include
any kind of communication between the executive and the ratier since elections change
the composition of the parliament, and thus render any pre-negotiation communication
useless. Reinhardt (1996) studies the e¤ects of domestic uncertainty on international
bargaining outcomes, discusses the links between institutional setup and domestic un-
certainty, and empirically tests the relationship between certain domestic institutional
sources of uncertainty and international bargaining outcomes using a database of trade
disputes conducted under the purview of the General Agreement on Tari¤s and Trade
(GATT).
In this chapter I follow Iida (1996), Milner and Rosendorf (1997a), and Reinhardt
(1996), and start with the argument that an executive may lack information about
domestic preferences. I then take an additional step and argue that the informational
deciency can not be an explanation to involuntary defection by itself since in most
cases the executive has the opportunity to communicate with the ratier to cure her
deciency. Consequently, my model incorporates communication between the ratier
and the executive. My model di¤ers from Milner and Rosendorfs since I keep the
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players xed throughout the game, which, consequently, makes communication possible.
My analysis also extends Iidas work by allowing strategic misrepresentation and by
demonstrating how it can render all communication ine¤ective.
This chapter also contributes to the literature on the strategic transmission of pri-
vate information via cheap-talk (Landi and Colucci, 2008; Kartik et.al. 2008; Kartik,
2007; for a detailed survey of the literature please see Ganguly and Ray, 2006). My
model is a variant of the canonical model for strategic cheap talk communication by
Crawford and Sobel (1982). In their path-breaking work, Crawford and Sobel develop
a model of strategic communication between a sender with private information and a
receiver who after observing the message takes an action that determines the welfare of
both. The authors demonstrate that under standard assumptions, equilibrium commu-
nications always take a certain form in which the sender partitions the support of the
variable that represents his private information and introduces noise into his signal by
reporting only which element of the partition his information actually lies in. Crawford
and Sobel argue that the equilibrium whose partition has the greatest number of ele-
ments is a reasonable one for agents to coordinate on as it is Pareto-superior to all other
equilibria (before the sender observes his private information). In this chapter, I iden-
tify the conditions under which the only equilibrium partition is the support set itself,
and thus there is no information transmission. This chapter is also closely related to
Matthews (1989) who extends the Crawford-Sobel model, and studies veto-bargaining
in domestic policy making via a three-stage signaling game in which he has two players;
a policymaker, who proposes a new policy to replace an existing one, and a ratier, who
chooses between the proposed and the existing policy. The preferences of the ratier is
private information. At stage one, the ratier makes a declaration about his preferred
policy. Then the policymaker proposes a new policy, which the ratier accepts or ve-
toes. Matthews shows that in equilibrium only a very limited amount of information
transmission between the ratier and the policymaker is possible, which means that
the proposed policy runs the risk of being rejected by the ratier. I extend Matthews
model and show that, under certain assumptions a stronger result holds, namely that
in equilibrium, information transmission between the policy maker and the ratier is
not possible.
3.3 The Ratication Game
Two countries bargain on an international cooperation agreement to replace the
existing state of a¤airs between them. The international bargain is conducted by ex-
ecutives from the two countries. For the result of their bargain to come into e¤ect,
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it must be ratied in the legislatures of both countries. Ratication requires that at
least a certain number of legislators approve the international agreement. One of the
executives knows for sure that she has enough legislative support at home backing her
bargaining position5. Whereas the other executive is not as lucky and can not rely on
party votes either because her party does not have enough seats, or because there is
a faction within her party that opposes cooperation with the other country. Thus she
needs the votes of another group in the parliament6. This group might be an opposition
party, a faction within the executives party, or a cross-party coalition of legislators who
share similar views on cooperation with the foreign country. But she lacks information
about that groups preferences. There is communication between the executive and
the group of legislators. Thus, she can try to eliminate her informational deciency
through communication. All communications are public, thus any information the ex-
ecutive gathers is available to her counterpart at the international negotiation table as
well. Below, I model the above interaction as a signaling game.
The game has three players: the foreign executive, denoted by F, the domestic
executive, denoted by D, and a domestic ratier, denoted by P. The policy space
is one-dimensional and is represented by the real line <: The players have symmetric,
single-peaked preferences on <. In other words, each has an ideal policy on <, and
each prefers a policy closer to her ideal than a policy that is farther. Let f; d; t 2 <
be the ideal policies of the foreign executive, the domestic executive, and the domestic
ratier respectively. And let the following payo¤ functions represent the preferences of
the players in the same order:
UF (a) =   ja  f j
for the foreign executive,
UD(a) =   ja  djk
for the domestic executive, where k 2 <, and k  1. k determines the domestic
executives attitude towards risk. As k increases D becomes more risk averse. And
5This might be because she has complete information about domestic preferences which enables
her to position herself accordingly, or because her party has strong discipline and enough seats in the
legislature for ratication.
6There may of course be multiple groups in the parliamanent with whom the executive can try to
build a coalition. But communication with multiple agents is out of the scope of this article. So, I
assume that there is only one group with whom the executive can form a ratication coalition. This
is equivalent to assuming that in a setup with multiple groups available for coalition, the executive
knows which one is the pivotal group. This is not an unrealistic assumption since one would expect
an executive to have an idea about how extreme each group is.
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nally,
UP (a; t) =   ja  tj
for the domestic ratier, where a 2 <. In other words, the payo¤ that a player gets
from a policy a 2 < depends on the distance between the ideal policy of the player and
a:
The ideal policies of the executives, that is, f and d; are common knowledge. With-
out loss of generality, assume f < d: The ideal policy of the domestic ratier P however,
is private information to P . That is, F and D do not know the exact value of t. They,
however, know that it is a random variable with distribution function G; and density
function g, with domain T  < . I assume G(d) = 0, which means that P is more
hawkish in its stance towards F than D is. G is common knowledge. I will simply refer
to t as Ps type, and T as the type space.
There is a status quo policy, q 2 <, in place. If F and D can agree on a new
policy and get P to vote for their agreement, they can replace the status quo with this
new policy they agreed upon.
The game has three stages:
(i) At stage one, P observes its type which is a draw by Nature from its distribution,
and makes a declaration about it by sending a message m(t) 2M; where M is the set
of messages P can send. If, for example, P chooses to truthfully reveal her type,
then her message will be m(t) = t: But, note that the ratier can always choose to
strategically misrepresent her type. The ratiers declaration strategy is then a
function p : T  ! 4(M) that maps the true preferred policy of P to a probability
distribution on the set of messages. p(m; t) then denotes the probability that P will
send the message m given that its ideal policy is t.
(ii) At stage two D and F bargain on a new policy to replace the status quo q using
the information they get from P 0s message m. Let (a;m) denote F and Ds common
belief about the probability of ratication of an agreement a given that P has sent the
message m at stage one. Note that F and D should have the same belief since they are
exposed to the same information. I use the Nash Bargaining Solution (Nash, 1950) to
model the international negotiation which means the result of the international bargain
solves the following maximization problem,
max
a2<
(a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)] (1)7
7Derived from the following maximization problem:
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There may be multiple agreements that maximize the objective function in (1): I as-
sume that there is a commonly known protocol in place that determines the resulting
agreement in such cases. It will be clear in the following sections that my results do not
depend on the choice of a specic protocol, so any protocol is acceptable as long as it
clearly states out a selection rule among Nash Bargaining solutions. Let N : M =) <
be a correspondence that gives for each message the associated Nash Bargaining out-
comes of the international negotiation. And let  : M ! < be a renement of the
correspondence N that for each m maps N(m) to (m) 2 N (m), the resulting agree-
ment of the international negotiation when P sends the message m.
(iii) At stage three, P makes a choice between the agreement (m) that D and F
reach at stage two and the status quo policy q. If P chooses the agreement over the
status quo, the agreement replaces the status quo, if not, the status quo prevails. The
ratiers ratication strategy is then a function v : < ! f0; 1g that maps each policy
proposal to a ratication decision. P accepts an agreement a if v(a) = 1, and rejects if
v(a) = 0:
A strategy for P is then a pair (p; v) where (i) p : T  ! 4(M) is a declaration
strategy, and (ii) v : < ! f0; 1g is a ratication strategy. Given p, v, and , say a type
t sends message m if p(m; t) > 0. Message m induces agreement a if (m) = a:
Similarly, a is induced by type t if it is induced by a message sent by type t.
Let the status quo policy be such that f < d < q: Note that the other cases are
trivial and uninteresting for the purposes of our analysis. For q < f , the Nash bargain
results in f , which F and D know is ratiable since it is closer to all possible types of
P than q is.8 For f  q  d, there is no room for international cooperation since there
is no alternative policy that F and D both prefer to the status quo. Only when d < q,
Ps type becomes important for F and D.
Finally, I assume that t is uniformly distributed over T; and that T = [d; q]. In other
words, I limit T to only those types that are more hawkish in their stance towards F
than D is, but nonetheless, are not against cooperation with F: It can easily be shown
that all the results that I derive in the following sections remain valid under a uniform
max
a2<
[(a;m)UD(a) + (1  (a;m))UD(q)  UD(q)][(a;m)UF (a) + (1  (a;m))UF (q)  UF (q)]
8For k = 1, the Nash bargain results in f whenever q  f , and in q whenever f < q < d: Kihlstrom,
Roth and Schmeidler prove that the utility which Nashs solution assigns to a player increases as
his opponent becomes more risk averse (Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidler, 1981, p.67). Then, as k
increases, the Nash bargaining should result in an agreement that would give F a higher utility than
she would get if she were to bargain with a risk neutral D. This implies that as k increases, there
would be no change in the Nash bargaining solution while q  d regardless of how risk averse the
domestic executive is. For q > d; Kihlstrom, Roth and Schmeidlers result implies that for k > 1, the
international negotiation would yield an agreement a such that f  a < d.
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type distribution over an interval that also includes types that are against cooperation
with F (that is, T can be extended to some [d; r], where r > q). But, this extension only
brings further notational complication without changing the results. So, I limit the type
space to [d; q]. This limitation enables us to see whether D and P can communicate
to eliminate, or at least mitigate, the danger of ratication failure when it is common
knowledge that both support cooperation with F . Without loss of generality, normalize
f =  1; d = 0, and q = 1: Hence, T = [0; 1].
Denition 1 An equilibrium in the above game is, i) a strategy couple (p; v); for
P , composed of a declaration strategy and a ratication strategy; ii) a function  that
maps each received message to an international agreement; and a belief  held by the
domestic and the foreign executives about ratiability of alternative agreements where
1)For all t 2 [0; 1]; R
M
p(m; t)dm = 1 and if m is in the support of p(:; t) then m
solves
max
m2M
  j(m)  tj
2)For all t 2 [0; 1];
v(a; t) =

1 if ja  tj  jq   tj
0 if otherwise
3)For all m 2M; (m) 2 [f; q]; and (m) 2 N(m), that is, (m) solves
max
a2<
[(a;m)]2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)] (1)
where (a;m) is the conditional probability that a will be accepted.
4) For all m 2M such that p(m; t) > 0 for some t 2 [d; q], (a;m); satises
(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt
qR
d
p(m; t)g(t)dt
:
The rst item in the equilibrium denition requires that Ps declaration strategy is
a best response to . The second item requires P to vote yes for an agreement that
it weakly prefers to the status quo. The third item requires that the outcome of the
international negotiation should be a solution to the Nash Bargain between F and D
and in case there are multiple solutions, it must be agreed upon in accordance with the
prespecied, commonly known international protocol. Finally, the fourth item in the
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equilibrium denition requires that, based on the equilibrium declaration of P , players
F andD revise their prior belief about t via Bayesian updating. What is important here
is that, for any message that has a positive probability of being sent in equilibrium,
the revised belief of F and D following that message should be consistent with the
declaration strategy of P . If, for example, Ps equilibrium declaration strategy is to
declare twice its ideal policy, the revised belief should assign probability one to t = m

2
.
3.4 Equilibria
In this section I conduct an equilibrium analysis of the ratication game. In any
equilibrium, my main point of interest is the amount of information transmission ac-
complished in that equilibrium. I try to see if the game has equilibria in which commu-
nication resolves or attenuates the informational deciency of the domestic executive,
and thus eliminates or mitigates the risk of ratication failure. I dene the size of
an equilibrium as the number of induced agreements in that equilibrium, and classify
the equilibria of the ratication game accordingly. The analysis below shows that the
ratication game has only size one equilibria. Moreover, in any size one equilibria, the
induced agreement is the same agreement that would be induced by a completely unin-
formative declaration strategy. In other words, the ratication game has no equilibrium
in which P can convey any information about its preferences to D and F by commu-
nication. This result demonstrates how domestic uncertainty can lead to ratication
failure. Given that only the same specic agreement can be induced in any equilibrium,
I then set out to see how that agreement and the risk of ratication failure it carries
change as the domestic executives attitude towards risk changes. It turns out that as
the domestic executive becomes more risk averse, the induced equilibrium agreement
shifts towards the status quo and thus, the risk of ratication failure it carries decreases.
A simple kind of equilibrium that always exists in signaling games is a babbling
equilibrium in which all types of the message sender send the same message with
the same probability rendering the declaration strategy completely uninformative. A
babbling declaration strategy is also called a fully pooling strategy since all
types pool on one probability distribution over the message set. In my model, the
following declaration strategy, for example, would be a babbling one:
p(m; t) = p(m; t0) > 0 for all t; t0 2 [d; q] and for all m 2M
Similarly,
p(m; t) =

1 if m = m0
0 if m 6= m0
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is a babbling declaration strategy. Given that the message received is uninformative
the receiver of the message then is to act on her prior belief as she has not received any
new information.
In a babbling equilibrium then, P employs a fully pooling declaration strategy in
which all types send the same message with the same probability. And since the message
is uninformative about t, F and D rely on their prior belief to conduct the international
negotiations. Since messages are being ignored, it is a best response for P to babble.
Proposition 2 The ratication game has babbling equilibria in which the domestic
ratier employs an uninformative, babbling declaration strategy, and the international
negotiation results in the agreement abab 2 [d; q):
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the ratication game has multiple babbling equilibria since there are
multiple babbling strategies P can employ. But all babbling equilibria have the same
induced agreement. Since the declaration strategy is uninformative, D and F bargain
based on their prior belief (that t is uniformly distributed on [d; q]). Thus, all babbling
declaration strategies lead to the same Nash bargaining equation (which also has a
unique maximizer), and thus, to the same agreement. And since there is only one
induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium, all babbling equilibria are size one.
Proposition 3 When D is risk neutral the induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium,
abab; corresponds to Ds ideal agreement d, but as she becomes more and more risk
averse abab moves towards the status-quo away from the ideal agreements of both F and
D. Since F and D are incompletely informed about the preferences of P , there is a
possibility that abab will be voted down, but that possibility decreases as D becomes more
risk averse.
Proof. See Appendix A.
A babbling declaration strategy does not resolve the uncertainty about domestic
preferences, and thus, the induced agreement faces the risk of ratication failure. In-
terestingly, that risk is negatively related to the risk aversion of the domestic executive.
In other words, an international agreement that is signed by a risk averse leader who
lacks information about domestic preferences is less prone to ratication failure than
an agreement that she would have signed if she had been less risk averse.
Remark 4 The induced agreement in any size one equilibria of the ratication game
is the agreement induced in a babbling equilibrium.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
What is of more interest is whether the ratication game has any equilibrium in
which P is able to convey some information about its preferences.
Proposition 5 The ratication game has no fully separatingequilibrium. Thus, full
information transmission is not possible.
Proof. A fully separating equilibrium requires P to employ a declaration
strategy that would reveal its type by sending a di¤erent message for each possible
type (hence the declaration strategy separates each type from another). Given an
equilibrium message m then, F and D can solve for p 1(m) = t. With p invertible,
(a;m) should be as follows;
(a;m) =

1 if a  2p 1(m)  q
0 otherwise
where t = p 1(m): The result of the Nash Bargain, (m); then solves
max
a2[f;q]
(1  jajk) (1  a) subject to 2p 1(m)  q  a (2)
Note that the objective function in (2) can not have a maximizer in (d; q], and that it
is strictly decreasing in <+ which implies that any maximizer it has in [f; q] must be in
[f; d]. Thus, for t > d+q
2
; a fully separating declaration strategy induces 2t   q as the
international agreement. But this can not be an equilibrium because any type t with
t > d+q
2
can increase its payo¤ simply by sending the message of type t+q
2
.
The ratication game has no fully separating equilibrium which means that com-
munication can not get rid of uncertainty completely. The most we can hope for now
is partial information transmission. Note that with full information transmission ruled
out, we know that in equilibrium, we can not get rid of the risk of ratication failure.
The question now is whether we can have some communication in equilibrium, that
would mitigate that risk. The following results demonstrate that we can not.
Proposition 6 In any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced agreement in the
(d; q) interval.
Proof. Suppose two distinct agreements x; y 2 (d; q) are both induced in some
equilibrium. Without loss of generality, assume x < y: Since (m) is by denition
unique for each m; it must be that x and y are induced by di¤erent messages. Let
t0 = x+y
2
. Then UP (x; t0) = UP (y; t0). Moreover, for each t > t0, Up(x; t) < Up(y; t).
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Thus, a type t > t0 never sends a message that induces x: So, when F and D receive a
message that they respond by agreeing on x they know that the message comes from a
type in [d; t0]: Note that, since x < q and y < q, it must be that UP (x; t0) > UP (q; t0).
Thus, by continuity of UP (:; t); type t0 would accept an agreement slightly to the left of
x with probability one and so does any type t < t0: But then we have a contradiction
since agreeing on x can not be optimal for F and D when they receive the message m:
They can both increase their utilities by agreeing on something slightly to the left of
x:
We know by incentive compatibility that, in equilibrium, there can not be an in-
duced agreement outside [f; q]. Proposition 4, facilitates our search further by demon-
strating that in any equilibrium, there can only be one induced agreement in (d; q):
Proposition 7 In any equilibrium, there can be at most one induced agreement in the
[f; d] interval.
Proof. First note that for any received message m 2 M , (m) is unique by
construction. Thus, if there exists multiple induced agreements in the [f; d] interval
in an equilibrium, it must be that each is induced by a di¤erent message. Take any
two induced agreements x; y 2 [f; d] and without loss of generality let y < x: Since I
have restricted the type space to the [0; 1] interval, it must be that all types strictly
prefer x to y. But then no type sends the message that induces y: Hence, we have a
contradiction.
Proposition 4 and 5 together cover almost the whole set of incentive compatible
agreements: I have only one other possible agreement that can be induced in an equi-
librium, and that is the status quo itself;
Proposition 8 The ratication game has no equilibrium in which the status quo is
an induced agreement. In other words, there is no equilibrium in which, based on the
message that P sends, F and D agree on q:
Proof. We know, by Proposition 1, that q is not the induced agreement in a
babbling equilibrium. Thus, q can only be an induced agreement in an equilibrium in
which there is at least one other induced agreement x 2 [f; q). By Proposition 4, we
know that there can be at most one other induced agreement in (d; q): By Proposition 5,
we know that there can be at most one other induced agreement in [f; d]. (Note that an
induced agreement in equilibrium can not be to the right of q since it is not individually
rational for F and D to agree on anything that is worse for them than the status quo.)
Let x be the maximum of the other induced agreements in equilibrium. Let t0 = x+q
2
:
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Then, it must be that UP (x; t0) = UP (q; t0): Moreover, for each t < t0, it must be that
UP (x; t) > UP (q; t). Thus, a type t < t0 would never send a message that induces q.
Similarly, for each t > t0, it must be that UP (x; t) < UP (q; t). Thus, a type t > t0 would
never send a message that induces x; nor a message that induces anything to the left
of x for that matter. Thus, when F and D receive a message that they respond by
agreeing on q, they know that the message must have come from a type t  t0. Take
any y 2 (t0; q). All types in [t0; y+q
2
] strictly prefer y to q. And, since for all t 2 [d; q];R
M
p(m; t)dm = 1; there must be at least one message, say m0; that these types send
with positive probability. Note that when F and D observe a message that is sent by
a type in [t0; y+q
2
] with positive probability, they would be better of agreeing on y than
q. Suppose F and D observe m0: Since all types in [t0; q] induce q, m0 must induce q.
But, then we have a contradiction since with positive probability m0 is coming from a
type in [t0; y+q
2
]:
To summarize,
 we know, by incentive compatibility that, all induced agreements in equilibrium
must be in [f; q];
 we know, by Proposition 6 that, q is not an induced agreement in any equilibrium;
 we know, by Proposition 4 that, in any equilibrium, there can be at most one
induced agreement in (d; q);
 we know, by Proposition 5 that, in any equilibrium, there can be at most one
induced agreement in [f; d];
 we know, by Proposition 1, that the ratication game has size one equilibria, and
all size one equilibria have the same induced agreement that is in [d; q):
Thus, we can conclude that, the ratication game can have only two types of equi-
libria: size one equilibria with abab as the induced agreement and size two equilibria
in which there are two induced agreements, one in [f; d], and one in (d; q): Now, I will
investigate and if it exists, characterize this second type of equilibria.
An equilibrium with two induced agreements y 2 [f; d];and x 2 (d; q), implies a
partition of the type space into two parts. Let t = x+y
2
. Then a type t would be
indi¤erent between the two agreements. Moreover, for each t < t, t would strictly
prefer y to x, and thus would never send the message(s) that induce x. Similarly, for
each t > t, t would strictly prefer x to y, and thus would never send the message(s)
that induce y. Hence, when F and D receive a message that respond by agreeing on x
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(y), they know the message is coming from a type t  t0 (t  t0). To characterize size
two equilibria then, I need to nd out if such equilibrium partitions of the type space
exist. Note that there can not be an equilibrium partition with t > 1
2
since that would
require both x and y to be in (d; q). We know by Proposition 4 that there is no such
equilibrium.
Take any t 2 (0; 1
2
] and let P send the signal h (high) if t > t and l (low) if t  t9:
Lemma 9 When D and F receive the message l, the international Nash Bargain results
in (l), where f  (l)  d:
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now, suppose the equilibrium message is h; which signals that the ideal policy of
P is above t;
Lemma 10 When D and F receive the message h, the international Nash Bargain
results in (h), where d < (h) < q.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Now we can summarize the international bargain given that P employs the decla-
ration strategy p(t) =

l with p(l;t)=1 if tt
h with p(h;t)=1 if tt : The international agreement induced
by the message l is (l), and the international agreement induced by the message h is
(h): For an equilibrium to exist it must be that P has no incentive to deviate from
her signaling strategy. For P to have no incentive to deviate from the above signaling
strategy it must be that neither a low type nor a high type should have any incentive
to mimic the other. This happens only when each type prefers what its signal brings to
what the other signal would have brought. In other words, for an equilibrium to exist
it must be that for some t; 
(l)+(h)
2
= t: Note that in such a situation neither a high
type nor a low type could get an agreement closer to its ideal by mimicking the other.
Proposition 11 The ratication game only has size one equilibria. In other words,
there is no equilibrium in which it is possible for the domestic ratier to convey infor-
mation to the executive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 7 states that there is no k  1, and t 2 (0; 1), for which (l)+(h)
2
= t:
This means the game has no size two equilibrium and hence we are left with only size
9One can use other messages. To facilitate the discussion, I am using a maximal size two pooling
strategy in which all types that induce a particular agreement send the same message.
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one equilibria with abab as the induced agreement: This result implies that the executives
have to conclude the international negotiations with nothing but their prior belief about
the preferences of the domestic legislators. And thus, there is always a risk that the
agreement will fail ratication.
3.5 Conclusion
I study a game in which two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status
quo state of a¤airs between them. For their agreement to come into e¤ect, they need
the approval of a third agent whose payo¤ is also determined by the prevailing state.
The two bargainers have uncertainty about the preferences of this third agent, but
they can always communicate with her to resolve their uncertainty. In the rst stage
of the game, communication takes place; in the second stage the bargainers reach
an agreement; and in the nal stage the third agent chooses to accept or reject the
agreement. If she accepts, the agreement replaces the status quo, if not the status
quo prevails. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide
an explanation to the puzzling observations of involuntary defections. International
agreements are usually reached at the end of a bargain between executives of countries
side to the deal. The agreement the executives reach comes into e¤ect only after
parliamentary ratications. The formal linkage politics literature generally takes it
as given that executives are fully informed about the preferences of their legislatures.
And that any uncertainty players may have in a two-level-game setting originates from
other informational asymmetries. Under such an assumption, it is di¢ cult to explain
involuntary defections the latest example of which is the failed military cooperation
agreement between Turkey and United States. The question that begs an answer is
how an executive can bring home an international agreement only to have a legislative
rejection that damages not only the relations of the countries party to the agreement but
also the political career of the executive herself. I argued in this chapter that the answer
might be about informational deciencies on the part of the executive. An executive
might be uncertain about domestic preferences, and the analysis above demonstrates
that in some cases communication does not resolve her uncertainty.
I model communication as cheap talk which means conveying messages does not
carry any distinguishing costs on the part of the legislators. The cheap-talk design is
preferred over a costly-signaling one because I believe it better represents the real-life
cases that motivate this article. Legislators actually have a wide variety of actions
that can act as signals. They, for example, can initiate a round of hearings, pass
resolutions, vote on straw polls, hold press conferences, make speeches on the oor,
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call upon regulatory agencies to tighten enforcement of existing legislation, or even
personally visit the executive. It can be argued that most of these acts may carry
reputational costs, but it is di¢ cult to argue that such reputational costs would be a
distinguishing factor among legislators since that requires these costs to vary with the
preferences of legislators on the outcome of the international negotiation. While it is
true that an involuntary ratication failure can be costly for legislators as well as the
executive, and that legislators would try to avoid such a situation by communicating
their preferences, it seems the array of signaling devices they have at their disposal
are limited in their ability to carry information (Reinhardt, 1996). Nevertheless, there
might be cases for which costly signaling arguments can be made, and thus it is a useful
exercise to consider a costly-signaling version of the model. I conduct this exercise in
Appendix C.
Another interesting result my analyses demonstrate is that, with communication
channels devalued, legislators with similar preferences as the executive prefer a leader
that can take risks, whereas legislators whose preferences diverge from those of the
executive prefer a more risk averse leader. And in the latter case, the probability of a
ratication failure decreases as the executive becomes more risk-averse.
This study is motivated by some puzzling observations from the international re-
lations arena. Nevertheless, the model can easily be adapted to study domestic veto
bargaining situations in presidential bicameral systems where the president holds a veto
over proposed legislation. In that sense, my model also o¤ers a way to incorporate bi-
cameralism into studies of veto-bargaining in domestic policy making. The results then
point to the possibility of presidential vetoes in cases where the chambers are uncertain
about policy preferences of the president. More importantly, that possibility can not
be abated via communication between the chambers and the president.
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3.6 Appendix A
Proof. At the international negotiation stage, F and D bargain on an agreement
and the outcome of their bargain solves the following maximization;
max
a2[f;q]
[(a;m)]2(UD(a)  UD(q))(UF (a)  UF (q))
When P employs a babbling declaration strategy, she sends an uninformative message.
F and D update their belief via BayesRule which, in this case, results in their prior
belief. Since both executives base their expectations on their shared prior belief about
t, (a;m) = G(a+1
2
); and the above maximization becomes
max
a2[ 1;1]

(1  jajk)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

(A2)
For any a 2 (0; 1]; the Nash Bargaining objective function in (A2) evaluated at a yields
a higher value than the same function evaluated at ( a), which implies that I can
rewrite (A2) as
max
a2[0;1]

(1  ak)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

(A20)
Let
n1(a) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

1  a2
2

an let b(a) = (1  ak), and c(a) = (a+1
2
)(1 a
2
2
), where k  1. Then, n1(a) = c(a) b(a).
Note that both b and c are continuous, concave functions. Moreover, c(a) is maximized
at a = 1
3
and b(a) is maximized at a = 0, which implies, in the interval (1
3
; 1] both
functions are decreasing. Thus n1 can not have a maximum in (13 ; 1]: The rst derivative
of n1 is a continuously decreasing (second derivative is negative for a  13) function and
it is positive at a = 0 and, negative at a = 1
3
which implies there exists a unique
maximizer within the interval [0; 1
3
]:
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Proof of Proposition 2. For any message m, (m) solves
max
a2[ 1;1]
(E(UD(a)) + 1)(E(UF (a)) + 2))
where E(U(a)) denotes the expected value of U at a. If an interior solution to this
maximization problem exists, call it a, then it solves the following rst order condition,
(E(U 0F (a
))(E(UD(a)) + 1) + E(U 0D(a
))(E(UF (a)) + 2)) = 0
where
U 0(a) =
@U(a)
@a
Let
Q(a; k) = (E(U 0F (a))(E(UD(a)) + 1) + E(U
0
D(a))(E(UF (a)) + 2))
then,
@a
@k
=  @Q(a; k)=@k
@Q(a; k)=@a
ja=a
=  
"
@E(UD(a))
@k
E(UF 0(a)) + @E(U
0
D(a))
@k
(E(UF (a)) + 2))
@Q(a;k)
@a
#
a=a
Note that the denominator is negative since a is a maximizer of n1: From the rst
order condition, we know that
(E(U 0F (a
)) =  E(U
0
D(a
))(E(UF (a)) + 2))
(E(UD(a)) + 1)
then,
@Q(a; k)
@k
ja=a=  (E(UF (a))+2))

@E(U 0D(a))
@k
  @E(UD(a))
@k
 E(U
0
D(a))
(E(UD(a)) + 1)

a=a
I need to show that @Q(a;k)
@k
> 0 when a = abab:
Claim 2.1: E(U 0D(abab))  0:
Proof of Claim 2.1:When P employs a fully pooling strategy, Ds expected utility
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from an agreement a is
E(UD(a)) = (1  jajk)

a+ 1
2

  1 (A3)
Suppose we were to maximize (A3) on [ 1; 1]. Note that for all a 2 ( 1; 0); E(UD(a)) <
E(UD( a)), thus (A3) can not have a negative maximizer. Then maximizing (A3) is
equivalent to maximizing the following,
max
a2[0;1]
E(UD(a)) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

  1
This is a continuous, single-peaked function in a compact interval, thus it has a unique
maximizer. Let aD denote this maximizer, then aD solves the following rst order
condition,
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 1  ak   kak   kak 1 = 0
When k = 1; the rst order condition implies a = 0: At a = 0; @
2E(UD(a))
@a2
 0, thus
a = 0 is the unique maximizer when k = 1. When k > 1, @E(UD(a))
@a
is a continuous,
and strictly decreasing function on [0; 1]: It is positive at a = 0 and negative at a = 1.
Thus, it is equal to zero at a single point between 0 and 1; which means that, given k;
aD is unique.
The maximization in (A2) can be rewritten as
max
a2[ 1;1]

1  a2
2

(E(UD(a)) + 1)
with the following rst order condition,
 a(E(UD(a) + 1) +

1  a2
2

(
@E(UD(a)
@a
) = 0 (A4)
At a = aD;
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 0; and thus (A4) evaluated at a = aD is equal to aD(E(uD(aD)+
1) which is weakly less than zero, which implies abab  aD. Note that this inequality
becomes strict when k > 1: And, since abab  aD, E(U 0D(abab))  0. (End of Proof of
Claim 2.1)
Note that
(E(UF (abab)) + 2)) =
1  a2
2
 0 for all a 2 [0; 1]
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and,
(E(UD(abab)) + 1) = (1  ak)

a+ 1
2

 0 for all a 2 [0; 1]:
Then,
@E(UD(a))
@k
ja=abab=  
abab + 1
2
 akbab  log(abab) > 0; since abab 2 [0; 1]
@E(U 0D(a))
@k
ja=abab=   log(abab)(akbab + kakbab + kak 1bab )  akbab   ak 1bab
Claim 2.2: k log aD <  1.
Proof of Claim 2.2: k log aD <  1 implies aD < e  1k : At aD = e  1k
@E(UD(a))
@a
= 1  e  1k (k)   ke  1k (k)   ke  1k (k 1) < 0
thus, aD < e 
1
k : (End of Proof of Claim 2.2)
Since, k log aD <  1 and, abab  aD; @E(U
0
D(a))
@k
ja=abab is positive. Thus if
@E(UD0(a))
@k
ja=abab>
@E(UD(a))
@k
ja=abab 
E(UD0(abab))
(E(UD(abab)) + 1)
then we can conclude that @abab
@k
> 0: Note that the above inequality implies
  log(abab)(kakbab+kak 1bab ) akbab ak 1bab >
a2kbab log(abab) + ka
2k
bab log(abab) + ka
2k 1
bab log(abab)
1  abab
This inequality holds since k log abab <  1 (abab  aD < e  1k ) and 0 < 1   abab < 1;
which together imply that the left hand side is positive and the right hand side is
negative.
Proof of Remark 1. Take any size one equilibrium and let M+ be the set of
messages sent with positive probability in that equilibrium. IfM+ has only one element
then this must be a babbling equilibrium and we know in any babbling equilibrium the
unique induced agreement is abab. LetM+ contain n > 1messages. Then it must be that
(m) = a for all m 2M+. Let p be the declaration strategy of P in this equilibrium.
Then,
P
m2M+
p(m; t) = 1, for all t 2 T , p(m; t)  0; and R p(m; t)g(t)dt > 0, for all
m 2 M+: The belief that D and F hold about ratiability of alternative agreements
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given p should be
(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt
qR
d
p(m; t)g(t)dt
and a maximizes (a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]:
Let p0 be a declaration strategy in which each type sends each message in M+ with
equal probability. Then p0 is a babbling declaration strategy, and for each t 2 T; I can
write
p0(m; t) =
X
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)
and the belief that D and F hold about ratiability of alternative agreements given p0
should be
0(a;m) =
qR
d
v(a; t)
 P
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)

g(t)dt
qR
d
 P
m2M+
1
n
p(m; t)

g(t)dt
=
X
m2M+
qZ
d
v(a; t)p(m; t)g(t)dt =
X
m2M+
(a;m)cm
where 0  cm  1 is some constant for each m 2M+: Since p0 is a babbling declaration
strategy, we know that in equilibrium, abab will be induced. That is, abab will maximize
0(a;m)2[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]
which can be rewritten as X
m2M+
(a;m) cm
!2
[UD(a)  UD(q)][UF (a)  UF (q)]
Note that each element of this summation is maximized at a which means their sum is
also maximized at a:. But we know the induced agreement in a babbling equilibrium
is unique and it is equal to abab: Thus, a = abab.
Proof of Lemma 1. After observing the message l, Ds expected utility from
signing an international agreement a becomes,
E(UD(a)) =
  jajk if a  2t  1
a+1
2t
(1  jajk)  1 if a  2t  1
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and Fs expected utility of signing an international agreement a becomes,
E(UF (a)) =
 (a+ 1) if a  2t  1
a+1
2t
(1  a)  2 if a  2t  1
and thus, (l) solves,
max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

Let
n2(a) = (1  jajk)(1  a)
and
n3(a) =
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

Note that n2(2t  1) = n3(2t  1). Moreover, since t  12 ;
max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

= max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1  a2
2

with
@ 1
t
2
 
a+1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1 a2
2

@a
ja2[ 1;0]> 0
which means
argmax
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  ( a)k)

1  a2
2

= 2t  1
Then,
max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); max
a2[ 1;2t 1]
1
t
2

a+ 1
2

(1  jajk)

1  a2
2

= max

max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a); (1  2t  1k)(1  (2t  1)) = max
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
For a 2 [2t  1; 0]; n2(a) = (1  ( a)k)(1  a) and,
@n2(a)
@a
=
@(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
@a
= k( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k   1
At a =  1; @n2(a)
@a
= 2k > 0; and a = 0; @n2(a)
@a
=  1. Moreover, @2n2(a)
@a2
< 0 for all
a 2 [ 1; 0]: Thus, @n2(a)
@a
must be equal to zero at exactly one point within [ 1; 0]:
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For a  0; n2(a) = (1 ak)(1 a): This is a strictly decreasing function in a. Thus,
argmax
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
is unique and it is in [2t   1; 0]: In other words, (1   jajk)(1   a) is single peaked in
[ 1; 1], and its maximizer is in [ 1; 0]:
Proof of Lemma 2. After observing the message h, Ds expected utility from
submitting an international agreement a for ratication becomes
E(UD(a)) =
  1 if a  2t  1
 a+1 2t
2(1 t) jaj
k   1

1  a+1 2t
2(1 t)

if a  2t  1
and Fs expected utility from signing an agreement a becomes
E(UF (a)) =
 2 if a  2t  1
 a+1 2t
2(1 t) (1 + a)  2

1  a+1 2t
2(1 t)

if a  2t  1
Since both F and D obtain higher expected utilities from an agreement a that satises
a  2t  1, we can characterize (h) as
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  jajk) (4)
Let the objective function in (4) be denoted by n4(a), then,
@n4(a)
@a
=

a+ 1  2t
4(1  t)2

[2(1 a)(1 jajk) (a+1 2t)(1 jajk) k jajk 1 jaj
a
(1 a)(a+1 2t)]
@n4(a)
@a
ja=2t 1= 0 and
@2n4(a)
@a2
ja=2t 1> 0 =) a = 2t  1 is a minimum.
@n4(a)
@a
ja=1= 0 and @
2n4(a)
@a2
ja=1> 0 =) a = 1 is a minimum.
Since t < 1
2
, we have 2t   1 < 0. Moreover, @n4(a)
@a
> 0 for all a 2 (2t   1; 0), which
implies 0  (h) < 1: For a = 0 to be feasible, it must be that t = 1
2
; but we know
that 2t  1 is a minimum, thus, we can conclude 0 < (h) < 1: Then, we can rewrite
(h) as
(h) = argmax
a2[max(0;2t 1);1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
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
a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak) is a continuous function and [max(0; 2t  1); 1] is a compact
interval, thus it has a maximumwithin this interval. Note that for a 2 [max(0; 2t 1); 1];
E(UD) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  ak)  1
This is a continuous, and strictly concave function. Similarly, for a 2 [max(0; 2t 1); 1];
E(UF ) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  a)  2
which, again, is a continuous and strictly concave function. Moreover, [max(0; 2t 1); 1]
is a convex set. Then, it must be that the Nash bargaining solution is unique. Moreover,
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  a)

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)

(1  ak)
and this is the multiplication of two positive-valued functions that are single peaked in
[0; 1], which means that their product is also single peaked in [0; 1].
Proof of Proposition 7. Claim 7.1: (l) is weakly decreasing in k.
Proof of Claim 7.1:
(l) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a)
I have shown in the proof of Claim 1 that (1  jajk)(1  a) is single peaked in [ 1; 1];
and its peak is in [ 1; 0] which means
max
a2[ 1;1]
(1  jajk)(1  a) = max
a2[ 1;0]
(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
Let a(k) = argmax
a2[ 1;0]
(1  ( a)k)(1  a), and let,
F (a; k) =
@(1  ( a)k)(1  a)
@a
= k( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k   1
Then F (a(k); k) = 0: Using the implicit function theorem,
@a(k)
@k
=  @F (a; k)=@k
F (a; k)=@a
ja=a(k)
=  

( a)k 1(1  a) + ( a)k 1(1  a)k log( a) + ( a)k log( a)
F (a; k)=@a

a=a(k)
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The denominator is negative since a(k) is a maximum. The numerator is negative if
k log( a(k)) <  1 which implies a(k) >  e  1k :
F ( e  1k ; k) = (ke 1 kk + ke 1 + e 1   1)
Note that F ( e  1k ; k) > 0 for k = 1; and it is increasing in k which implies a(k) >
 e  1k for all k  1. Thus, the above numerator is negative and @a(k)
@k
< 0:
We know that a(k) = (l) if a(k) 2 [2t   1; 0], and that (l) = 2t   1 if
a(k) < 2t   1: Thus, for those k values for which a(k) 2 [2t   1; 0], (l) is strictly
decreasing in k. Since @a
(k)
@k
< 0, given t; there exists k such that for all k > k,
a(k) < 2t  1: Then, @(l)
@k
jk>k= 0: Thus, @
(l)
@k
 0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.1)
Claim 7.2: (h) is increasing in k.
Proof of Claim 7.2:
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  jajk)
I have already proven (Proof of Claim 2) that this maximization problem has a unique,
nonnegative maximizer. Hence, we can write,
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
Let
n5(a) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
and let F (a; k) = @n5(a)
@a
: Then, F ((h); k) = 0. We can use the implicit function
theorem to analyze @
(h)
@k
:
@(h)
@k
=  @F (a; k)=@k
@F (a; k)=@a
ja=(h)
=  

a+1 2t
2(1 t)2

ak log(a)(a+1 2t
2
  1 + a) +

a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
ak 1(a  k log(a) + ka  1)
@F ((h); k)=@a
j
a=(h)
Claim 7.2.1: 
(h)+1 2t
2
  1 + (h)  0
Proof of Claim 7.2.1: Let
b(a) =

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)
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and c(a) = (1  ak): Then, n5(a) = b(a) c(a). Note that b(a) has a local maximum at
a = 1
3
+ 2
3
t; and that for all a > 1
3
+ 2
3
t, both b0(a) and c0(a) are negative. Thus, (h)
can not be greater than 1
3
+ 2
3
t:
(h) + 1  2t
2
  1 + (h) = 3
(h)  1  2t
2
and 3
(h) 1 2t
2
 0 since (h)  1
3
+ 2
3
t: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2.1)
Claim 7.2.2: ((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) > 0
Proof of Claim 7.2.2: For k = 1;
((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) = (2(h)  log((h))  1)
which is positive for all (h) 2 [0; 1]. Moreover,
@((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1)
@k
= (h)  log((h))
which is also positive for all (h) 2 [0; 1]. That is, the expression is increasing in k,
which means
((h)  k log((h)) + k(h)  1) > 0
for all k  1: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2.2)
Note that 
(h)+1 2t
2(1 t)2 > 0, and log(
(h)) < 0: Thus, the numerator of @
(h)
@k
is
positive. The denominator is negative since (h) is the maximizer of n5(a); which
then imply @
(h)
@k
> 0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.2)
Claim 7.3: (h) is increasing in t:
Proof of Claim 7.3: To calculate @
(h)
@t
; we can again make use of the implicit
function theorem and the rst order condition we have from the maximization of n5(a).
Let F (a; k; t) = @n5(a)
@a
: Then,
F (a; k; t) =
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

and F ((h); k; t) = 0. Then, using the implicit function theorem,
@(h)
@t
=   @F (a; k; t)=@t
@F (a; k; t)=@a
ja=(h)
Let,
b(a; t) =
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2
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and
c(a; t) =

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

Then, @F (a;k;t)
@t
= @b(a;t)
@t
c(a; t) + @c(a;t)
@t
b(a; t): Note that at a = (h);
c(a; t) =

(1  ak)(1  a)  a+ 1  2t
2
(1  ak + kak 1   kak)

= 0
from the rst order condition of the maximization of n5(a): So,
@F (a;k;t)
@t
= @c(a;t)
@t
b(a; t):
And
@c(a; t)
@t
= (1  ak + kak 1   kak) > 0 for all, a 2 [0; 1]
so it must be positive at a = (h): Since (h) > 2t 1; (h)+1 2t
2(1 t)2 is also positive Thus,
@F ((h); k)=@t > 0: We know that @F ((h); k)=@a < 0, since (h) is a maximum.
Thus, we can conclude that @
(h)
@t
> 0: (End of Proof of Claim 7.3)
We know that, given t 2 (0; 1
2
],
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)(1  ak)
When k = 1,
(h) = argmax
a2[2t 1;1]

a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)
2
(1  a)2
and it solves the rst order condition
a+ 1  2t
2(1  t)2

(1  a)( 2a+ 2t) = 0
which implies (h) = t: And, as k increases innitely, (1   ak) converges to one
and (h) then maximizes

a+1 2t
2(1 t)
2
(1   a), which, as I have shown, is maximized
at (h) = 1
3
+ 2
3
t: Given that (h) is increasing in both k and t, it must be that
(h) 2 [t; 1
3
+ 2
3
t]: We also know that when k = 1; (l) = 0: Thus, when k = 1,
the ratication game does not have a size two equilibrium. Moreover, we know that
@(l)
@k
 0 and @(h)
@k
 0: Then, if @(l)
@k
+ @
(h)
@k
< 0 we can conclude that our signaling
game has no size two equilibrium. Unfortunately it is not possible to evaluate these
derivatives and reach a conclusion but intuitively, one can expect @
(l)
@k
+ @
(h)
@k
to be
smaller than zero since as (h) gets larger it moves away from the ideal points of both
negotiators and thus faces stronger resistance whereas as (l) gets lower it gets closer
to Fs ideal point.
66
Although we can not evaluate the derivatives directly we can use the available
information to narrow down the parameter space in order to facilitate our search. First
of all, note that 
(l)+(h)
2
= t implies that at equilibrium (h) = 2t   (l): Given
that (l) < 0 for all k > 1, it must be that at equilibrium (h) > 2t: Since 1
3
+ 2
3
t is
the highest value (h) can take, we can conclude that there can not be an equilibrium
if 2t > 1
3
+ 2
3
t; that is, there can only be an equilibrium if t  1
4
:
We know that at an equilibrium 
(l)+(h)
2
= t and that t > 0: Thus, there can not
be an equilibrium if (l) + (h) < 0: We know the highest value (h) can attain
is 1
2
in the parameter interval we are investigating. If (l) (which is negative and
which can be calculated by going through the maximization of n2(a)) is smaller than
 1
2
for some k values within the k interval at hand, then we can exclude those k values
as there can be no equilibrium at those values. It can easily be shown that for all
k  3:6; (l) <  1
2
: Thus, in equilibrium it must be that k < 3:6: With some k
values eliminated, we can go back and recalculate the highest value (h) can get and
eliminate those t values that exceed half the highest value (h) can attain. Then we
can eliminate again those k values for which (l) is smaller than  (h): Iteratively we
can eliminate k and t values in this fashion. Appendix B contains the R code that does
these iterations reducing the parameter space which can harbor a size two equilibrium
to t 2 (0; 0:001), and k 2 (1; 1:0008):It is possible to continue and narrow down the
parameter space further but the calculations are limited by the precision limits of my
computer and the marginal benet of continuing. I argue that there is only size one
equilibria in this signaling game and so it is not possible for the legislature to convey
information to the executive.
3.7 Appendix B
m=1
h=seq(0,m,by=0.000001)
k=3.60000
t=0.250000
i=1
while (i<length(h)){
f=2*((h[i]+1-2*t)/((2-2*t)^2))*(1-h[i]^k)*(1-h[i])-(((h[i]+1-2*t)^2)/(2-2*t)^2)
*(h[i]^(k-1))*k*(1-h[i])-(((h[i]+1-2*t)^2)/(2-2*t)^2)*(1-h[i]^k)
if (f>0.000000)
i=i+1
else { cat(h=,, h[i],nn)
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if (t>h[i]/2)
{t=h[i]/2
i=1 }
else {cat(t=,,t,nn)
g=((2*t)^(k-1))*k*(1+(2*t))-1+((2*t)^k)
n=k
while (g<0 & k>=1){
n=n-0.000001
g=((2*t)^(n-1))*n*(1+(2*t))-1+((2*t)^n)}
n=n+0.000001
if (n<k)
{k=n
cat(k=,,k,nn)
i=1}
else
i=2000000 }}}
3.8 Appendix C
I will not go into detailed formal derivations, and leave it to for future study, but
we can get an idea about possible results of costly signaling by a simple exercise which
incorporates costly signaling into the model in a theoretical fashion:
Let m(t) 2 [0; 1] be P 0s declaration at stage one, after P observes its type which
is a draw by Nature from its uniform distribution on the [0; 1] interval. But this time
assume that there is a cost associated with making a declaration and that the cost is
m(t)
t
. Note that the declaration cost varies with Ps type. Let a(t) be the agreement
induced by a message sent by a type t ratier. Then by incentive compatibility it must
be that in equilibrium no type t can obtain a strictly higher payo¤ by emulating the
behavior of another type, say typet0. Thus, in equilibrium, for any t; t 2 T the following
inequalities must hold:
  ja(t)  tj   m(t)
t
   ja(t0)  tj   m(t
0)
t
  ja(t0)  t0j   m(t
0)
t0
   ja(t)  t0j   m(t)
t0
Without loss of generality, assume t0 < t. Note that by incentive compatibility on the
part of the foreign and domestic executives it must be that a(t) < t and a(t0) < t0, and
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thus a(t0) < t Since these inequalities must hold for any t; t0 2 T , let us take t0 such
that a(t) < t0. Then the above inequalities can be rewritten as:
 a(t) + t  m(t)
t
  a(t0) + t  m(t
0)
t
 a(t0) + t0   m(t
0)
t0
  a(t) + t0   m(t)
t0
Subtracting the RHS of the second inequality from the LHS of the rst, and the LHS
of the second from the RHS of the rst implies
m(t)  m(t0)
which means in any sequential equilibrium m(t) must be weakly monotone increasing
in t. This means for almost all t 2 T , either @m
@t
> 0 or @m
@t
= 0: 10In the former case,
the declaration by the ratier is separating, whereas in the second m(:) is a pooling
strategy since an interval of types send the same message. Thus, we can conclude that
this costly signaling game has pooling, semi-pooling, and separating equilibria. With
an abundance of equilibria, the question then becomes which ones should be relevant for
us. Note that it is possible to narrow down the set of possible equilibria by applying one
of the equilibrium renement concepts that are available in the theoretical literature
(Banks, 2001). I also leave such extensions for future studies.
10Monotonicity implies di¤erentiability almost everywhere (Banks, 2001)
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CHAPTER 4
THE EU EFFECT ON VOTE CHOICE IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS
4.1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the expansion of the jurisdictional authority
of the European Union (EU) over a range of policy areas from market integration, and
employment policy to foreign policy, and immigration, as well as the introduction of a
single currency, enlargement and the negotiation of a Constitutionfor Europe. As the
member states agreed to transfer more and more authority and competencies to the EU
level, the EU as an institution inevitably started to become a player in the domestic
politics of members states as well. The exact role and e¤ect of the European Union
on domestic politics in member states has attracted much scholarly attention in recent
years. In this article, I question the e¤ects of membership on vote choice in national
elections, a question that has previously been the subject to some important works of
scholarship (Evans, 1998; Hix, 2000; Bohrer and Tan, 2000; Van der Eijk and Franklin,
2001; Tillman 2008; Tillman 2004; Gabel 2000; Scheve 2000; De Vries, 2007; Schoen
2008). So far, researchers have attacked this question from two main fronts. On the
rst front, the focus has been to examine whether attitudes towards European Union
integration inuence party choice in national elections a phenomenon referred to as
European Union (EU) issue voting (Evans, 1998; De Vries, 2007; Gabel, 2000; Scheve
2000; Schoen 2008). The hypothesis on this front is straightforward: The level of agree-
ment over European integration between a citizen and a party should relate positively
to the likelihood of the citizen voting for that party. In other words, researchers have
examined whether EU issues now serve as a new electoral cleavage in domestic poli-
tics. The second front of research examines whether economic integration constrains
the perceived ability of national governments to pursue independent economic policies,
and thus, weaken economic voting. Findings suggest voters in EU member countries
reduce the weight they assign to economic performance evaluations and to party posi-
tions on economic issues, while increasing the salience of noneconomic issues (Tillman
2008; Tillman 2004; Gabel 2000; Hix, 2003).
Both these fronts have serious shortcomings. The rst one assumes that the EU
just adds another cleavage to domestic politics without having any e¤ect on pre-existing
cleavages. This is an assumption which ignores the common argument that the EU
structurally a¤ects domestic political competition by imposing constraints on domestic
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policy alternatives, and thus, limits the capacity of parties and political elites to deliver
policy (Gabel, 2000; Bohrer and Tan, 2000; Hix and Goetz, 2000). As Gabel (2000)
argues by joining the European Union (EU), member states accept a particular set
of policy choices regarding a broad range of economic and social issues and a suprana-
tional political authority to govern these policies. In other words, the EU changes the
policy spaces, and the institutional mechanisms of policy making in member countries.
Moreover, the integration that has taken place so far is here to stay. The pace of the
integration may have varied over time but there has never been a reversal once an in-
tegrative step had been accepted by member states. So, unless we assume that voters
are ignorant and/or naive, they should be acting with the information that their states
are members of the Union, and will remain so for the foreseeable future. So, the issue
is not just whether a person approves the EU and/or further integration or not, but
also whether and how his/her voting behavior changes within this new structure which
includes the EU as a political actor.
The second front of research takes into account the e¤ects that the EU might have
on issue priorities and political performance evaluations. More specically, it takes
into account that the single market and the Economic and Monetary Union restrict
micro and macro-economic policy options for governments. The claim is that voters in
member countries reduce the weight they assign to economic performance evaluations
and blame their government less for economic failure since the governments hands are
tied by EU membership. In other words, EU membership weakens economic voting.
The ndings are mixed (Tillman, 2008; Hellwig, 2001; Hellwig and Samuels, 2007).
The major shortcomings of this line of research are that it ignores that EU membership
imposes constraints on non-economic policy areas as well; and that measurements of
economic voting can only say something about votersevaluation of governing parties,
and leave us with no information about how evaluations of other parties are a¤ected.
The shortcomings of these two research fronts necessitate a more comprehensive
approach to study the e¤ects of EU membership on vote choice in national elections.
In this article, I try to develop one. I start with two key arguments, and then develop
a very simple vote choice model in light of these arguments, and nally, using survey
data from Britain, I test the hypotheses I derive from my model.
My rst key argument is that the EU structurally a¤ects domestic politics in mem-
ber countries. It limits the capacity of parties and political elites to deliver policy by
imposing constraints on policy spaces. Moreover, these constraints usually work as a
centrist pull over alternative policies. In other words, the EU works as a new veto
player with centrist policy preferences ruling out extremist alternatives. Hix makes a
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similar argument. He argues that the EU polity, as currently designed, presents se-
vere constraints on the process of political competition. Policy outputs from the EU
are relatively centrist: a moderately-regulated market, with a moderately-monetarist
macro-economic policy regime. And, because there are multiple veto-players in the
EU decision-making process, these EU policies are hard to change. The result is a set
of constraints on political competition. Parties on the left cannot promise high social
protection or expansionary spending policies, and parties on the right cannot promise
labour market deregulation or tax cuts.(Hix, 2003)
My second key argument is that voters are concerned with policy outcomes, and
thus they are concerned with how their votes are translated into policy. Hence, voters
care about the institutional setup that convert their votes into policy, and they take
this setup into account when formulating their vote choice.
Combining these two arguments, we can then conclude that when formulating their
vote choice, voters in EU member countries should take into account the e¤ect the EU
will have on the nal policy outcomes in their countries. In the next section, I build
on these arguments, and draw on recent voting behavior research to develop a set of
expectations for how voters evaluate parties di¤erently when they believe policy makers
to be constrained by EU membership. Then, in Section 4.3 I test these expectations
using survey data from the United Kingdom. Finally, I conclude in Section 4.4.
4.2 Vote Choice
How do voters decide which party to vote for? To answer this question we must
rst understand what voters care about and how what they care about a¤ect their vote
choice. There is a general agreement among students of political science that voters
care about political issues, and that they have their own views on these issues that they
care for. Political parties also advocate positions on issues. According to the proximity
theory of voting, voters assess party positions on the issues that they nd important
with respect to their own views, then vote for the party whose position they nd closest
to their own.(Hotelling 1929; Downs, 1957; Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Blais et.al., 2001)
But this is a very crude simplication of voting behavior. First of all, it implies that
voters either care about party platforms rather than nal policy outcomes, or that they
ignore the institutional setup that converts votes into policy and consequently believe
that what political parties advocate and what they will be able to implement when and
if they are elected are the same. If voters are concerned with policy outcomes rather
than platforms, then they should also care about the institutional mechanisms that will
play a role in the determination of the nal policy outcomes once they cast their votes to
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determine the government. To form their expectations about future policies then, they
should take into account the post election policy bargains among relevant institutions.
A policy outcome oriented voter would be interested in the congruence between the
expected outcome of such policy bargains and his/her own policy preferences rather
than the platforms advocated by political parties before the elections. In a seminal
paper, Kedar (2005) empirically demonstrates that voters are concerned with policy
outcomes and that they thus take into account the institutional setup that converts their
votes into policy. She shows that voters in consensual democracies employ a di¤erent
voting strategy than their counterparts in majoritarian systems as they expect coalition
governments, and post-election policy bargains among members of the coalition. In
other words, voters in consensual democracies expect that parties will not be able to
implement their advocated stances because nal policies will be determined through
bargains among coalition partners. And, they formulate their vote choice accordingly.
Then, a voter in a consensual democracy votes for the party whose presence in the
coalition will pull the outcome of the policy bargain closest to her/his preferred outcome.
Kedars conclusion also provides a rational explanation for the observed ideological
discrepancy between parties and their constituencies, with the former often being more
extreme than the latter on issues (Adams and Merrill 1999 and Iversen 1994b). If
voters predict their vote to be watered down along the path, then they prefer parties
to hold positions more extreme than their own opinions and the observed discrepancy
becomes consistent with voter preferences.
I have already argued in the introduction that the EU joins in member states in
the institutional setup of domestic policy making. In a sense, the EU takes part in post
election policy bargains through the constraints EU membership imposes on policy
spaces and through its centrist pull over alternative policies. If voters in EU member
states are concerned with policy outcomes then when formulating their vote choice they
should take into account the post-election centrist pull over policies that will be exerted
by the EU. They should then vote for the party whose stance, when subject to the EU
pull, will be brought closest to their own positions.
I will now construct a simple decision theoretic model to depict the arguments I
have made so far. The model is unidimensional, that is, the policy space in the model
has a single dimension. Voters are concerned about policy outcomes, that is, they
evaluate each party based on their expectations about the policies the party will enact if
elected. Although voters are concerned about future policy outcomes, that is although
they are forward-looking, they do not necessarily possess knowledge or expectations
regarding what all other voters will choose and thus, they do not coordinate their
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behavior accordingly. I make three additional assumptions regarding the information
voters possess. First, I assume that voters hold positions on the single dimensional
policy space. Second, I assume that they have a perception of partiespositions on the
same space. Note that this perception is entirely personal and need not be in line with
what the party or other voters think. Finally, I assume that voters hold beliefs about
the nature of the centrist pull the EU will exert on policy outcomes. Such a belief
will include the voters assessment of the outcome of the election, and the power of the
centrist pull that the EU will exert, and the power of the elected government to resist
to that pull.
Since voters care about nal policy outcomes, their utilities are dened in terms of
nal policies. The utility voter i gets from a policy p is
Uij =  (vi   p)2
where vi is the self-placement of voter i on the single-dimensional policy space. The
nal policy outcome p is the outcome of a Pareto optimal bargain among those involved
in policy making. In other words,
p = B(pi1; pi2; :::; pin)
where pij refers to voter is placement of party j: Consequently, in cases where elections
result in the clear victory of, and the formation of the government by a single party,
and the elected party can implement its preferred policy, p refers to voter is placement
of the governing party. I argue that in EU member countries, since the voters expect
the EU to exert a central pull on policies, the EU becomes a part to the nal policy
bargain, and p then becomes the outcome of the policy bargain among the governing
parties and the EU. In other words,
p = B(pi1; pi2; :::; pin; piEU)
where pEU refers to voter is placement of EU as a political actor on the single dimen-
sional policy space. I have already argued that the EU is expected to exert a central
pull on policies. Consequently, I will assume that piEU will be centrist for all i: In the
remainder of the article I will focus on single-party governments, so that p refers to
the expected nal policy outcome of the Pareto optimal bargain between the governing
party and the EU. Note that this is simply to make the analysis simpler and more
clear, and that the analysis can be easily enlarged to include consensual systems with
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coalitional governments.
Having represented voter is policy preferences, and having identied the relation
between policy outcomes and political parties, we can now dene voter is vote choice
rule. Voter i votes for the party which brings the nal policy outcome closest to his/her
preferred policy. In other words, voter is vote choice solves the following maximization
problem:
max
j2f1;2;::;ng
Uij = max
j2f1;2;::;ng
 (vi   p)2 = max
j2f1;2;::;ng
 (vi  B(pij; piEU))2
We can depict the EU e¤ect on nal policy outcomes with a simple gure:
Figure 4.1: EU e¤ect on nal policy outcomes
The centrist pull of the EU over policies, results in a nal policy outcome that
is closer to the center than the actual placement of the party j. In other words, the
centrist pull of the EU results in a policy that is in between the placement of the party
and the placement of the EU. Note that, the exact placement of the policy outcome
depends on voter is belief about the power of the centrist pull by the EU, and the
power of the elected party to resist this pull. In other words, the outcome of the
bargain depends on the bargaining power of the actors involved. If voter i believes that
the EU has all the bargaining power, then he expects p = pEU . Similarly, if voter i
believes party j; if elected, can withstand the pressures from the EU, then p = pij: In
any case, p 2 [pij; pEU ] if pEU  pij; and p 2 [pEU ; pij] if pij  pEU :
As can be seen from the above gure, my arguments about the EU e¤ect on nal
policy outcomes, and the way voters formulate their vote choice based on nal policy
outcomes imply that the EU should have an e¤ect on the results of national elections by
altering votersranking of political parties. Depending on his perception of the power
of the centrist pull of the EU and the power of candidate parties to resist that pull, a
voters ranking of political parties with and without the EU e¤ect may di¤er from each
other signicantly. Consequently, the presence of the EU e¤ect may lead him to vote
for a political party that he would not have voted for had his state not been a member
of the EU.
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Figure 4.2: EU e¤ect on party choice-1
In the above gure, pi denotes voter is most preferred policy, and he will vote
for the party whose preferred policy is closest to his own. We have three parties, and
voter i perceives party 1 to be closest to his policy preferences. Given that he is solely
concerned about policy outcomes, and that he expects party 1 to win the election, form
the government, and enact pi1; in the absence of the EU e¤ect, we would expect him to
vote for party 1. But voter i expects the EU to pull the nal policy outcomes towards
the center. That is, his expectations about policy outcomes under the governance of
each party is now di¤erent than his belief about the preferred policies of these parties.
And based on voter is expectations about nal policy outcomes, we should now expect
him to vote for party 2, instead of party 1.
Conjecture 12 The EU e¤ect may alter voters evaluations of ideological proximity
between themselves and political parties, and may lead them to vote for parties they
perceive more extremist than themselves, and for whom they would not have voted for
had the EU e¤ect been absent.
Figure 4.3: EU e¤ect on party choice-2
Similarly, in the above gure, we would expect voter i to vote for party 2. But voter i
expects the EU to pull the nal policy outcomes towards the center. And he believes
party 2 would not be able to stand against the pull of the EU and based on voter is
expectations about nal policy outcomes, we should now expect him to vote for party
1, instead of party 2.
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Conjecture 13 The EU e¤ect may alter votersevaluations of proximity relations be-
tween themselves and political parties, and may lead them to vote for parties they per-
ceive more moderate then themselves, and for whom they would not have voted for had
the EU e¤ect been absent.
Figure 4.4: EU e¤ect on party choice-3
Finally, in the above gure, we have a voter i who believes the EU has all the control
over the nal policy outcome, and thus he expects the nal policy outcome to be the
preferred policy of the EU no matter which party wins the election. In such a case we
may expect voter i to be indi¤erent among parties. He may then either vote for any of
them, or simply not waste the time and energy to go to the polls.
Conjecture 14 The EU e¤ect may alter voters evaluations of ideological proximity
between themselves and political parties, and may lead them to abstain.
In the next section, I empirically test these conjectures using survey data from the
oldest majoritarian democracy in the world, and a reluctant member of the EU, the
UK.
4.3 The Data
To test the conjectures I have made about the e¤ects of European integration on
national elections, I analyze data from the 2001 British Election Study (Sanders et.al.,
2001). The conjectures predict relationships between votersbeliefs about the power
of the EU e¤ect on domestic politics and voting behavior including party choice and
participation. The 2001 British Election Study includes questions that allow me to
assess respondentsbeliefs about the power of the EU e¤ect on domestic politics, and
their voting behavior.
My dependent variable is based on the reported voting behavior of respondents in
the post-election survey, and their placements of themselves and political parties on
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a 1-to-10 left-right scale in the pre-election survey.1 In the post-election survey, the
respondents were asked whether they had voted, and if they had for which party. In
the pre-election survey, they were asked to place themselves and the ve major parties
(Labor, Conservative, Liberal, Scottish National, Plaid Cymru) that contested in the
2001 elections on a 1-to-10 left-right scale, 1 being radical left, and 10 being radical
right. Note that placements on a left-right scale do not correspond to positions in
terms of a specic policy issue. However, nearly all empirical studies, conclude that
party placements along the leftright scale are structured to a great extent by positions
on economic issues (Hellwig, 2008). Huber and Inglehart, for example, (1995) nd that
economic issues were cited as the most important component of the leftright dimension
in all but ve of the 42 countries they examined. Also, Markss and Steenbergens
(1999) expert survey nds that their general leftright scale correlates highly with an
explicitly economic leftright scale (r = 0.92), indicating that the two scales tap the
same policy orientations for most parties. Moreover, previous studies show that left-
right self-placements are important predictors of vote choice (Gabel,2000). Gabel argues
that traditionally voters in the EU member states have chosen among parties based on
their positions on the left-right dimension, which is commonly understood to represent a
summary of policy preferences across a broad array of national political issues (Gabel,
2000). Hooghe et.al. (2002) show that there is a strong relationship between the
Left/Right dimension that chiey structures party competition in European societies
and European integration. Consequently, I argue that left-right placements provide
a better measure of political preferences and perceptions than placements on specic
policy dimensions. I generated a new variable called votstyle that is coded -1 if the
respondent voted for the party he placed closest to himself on the left-right scale; 0
if he voted for a more moderate party than the one he placed closest to himself; 1 if
he voted for a more extremist party than the one he placed closest to himself; 2 if he
abstained. The resulting distribution of respondents is as follows:
votstyle Frequency Percent Cumulative
-1 1210 49.13 49.13
0 124 5.03 54.16
1 351 14.25 68.41
2 778 31.59 100
Total 2463 100
Table 4.1: Distribution of Voting Patterns
1Those who refused to answer or did not give a meaningful answer to these questions were droped
from the data set.
78
As can be seen close to 20% of respondents voted for a party that they did not
place closest to themselves. That is, they acted against the predictions of the proximity
voting theory. There must be some strategic voting rational behind their behavior. My
argument is that the post election expectation of the centrist pull by the EU is part of
that rational.
To measure respondentsbelief about the power of the EU e¤ect on domestic poli-
tics, I use the responses to a question asking, Which one of the following do you think
a¤ects the general economic situation in the United Kingdom the most? Would you
say the British government or the European Union?Respondents had the option of
indicating Dont know, The British government, EU, or Both. Using these
responses, I generate a scale variable called euorgov that is coded 1 if the respondent
chose the British government; 2 if he chose both; 3 if he chose EU; and 4 if he
chose neither.2 As I have conjecturized in the previous section I expect those who
are higher on the euorgov scale to be more likely to vote for parties that they did not
place closest to themselves on the left-right scale, and to be more likely to abstain than
those who are lower on the same scale.
I include several other independent variables. I generated a dummy variable called
abstained that is coded 1 if the respondent abstained in the previous election and 0
otherwise to capture habitual abstention. Literature suggests those who abstain in an
election are more likely to do so in the following ones (Denny and Doyle, 2009).
Another strategic concern might be a respondents expectation about the results of
the election. In rational theories of voting the expected benet of voting is inuenced
by the probability of a¤ecting the election result. The closer the election is expected to
be, the higher becomes the probability that one vote a¤ects the outcome. This increases
the expected utility of voting and thereby voter turnout (Geys, 2006). Moreover, close
elections provoke more political elite mobilization e¤orts. These increased campaign
e¤orts, engaged in by the competing parties to tilt the balance in the appropriate di-
rection, lead to higher turnout rates (Cox and Munger, 1989; Kirchgaissner and Schulz,
2004). A voter who believes his favorite party has no chance of winning might also vote
for his second or third best if those parties have a shot at winning, in order not to waste
his vote. I use the responses to a question in the pre-election survey asking How close
do you think the elections will be in your district?to generate a scale variable called
closeness to capture such strategic voting behavior. I expect respondents who think
that elections will be close in their district to be more likely to vote. Whether they will
be more likely to vote for the party they place closest to themselves or not depends
2I excluded from the analysis those who indicated they did not know.
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on which party they place closest to themselves, and which parties they believe will
be part of this close race. I expect those who believe the party they place closest to
themselves will not be part to the competition to be more likely to vote for a party that
is more likely to succeed. And I expect those who believe the party they place closest to
themselves has a shot to vote for that party. Unfortunately, the study does not include
questions to decipher such information. Thus, I do not have any prior expectations
about the e¤ect of closeness on voting behavior except that I expect it to be negatively
related to the likelihood of abstention.
Another important determinant of voting behavior is party identity. The pre-
election survey asks the respondents whether they identify themselves with a politi-
cal party. Based on the answers to these questions I created a dummy variable called
identity which is coded 1 if the respondent identies himself with a political party and
0 if he does not. I expect those who identify themselves with a political party to be
more likely to vote and to be more likely to vote for the party they place closest to
themselves.
Finally, I included personal characteristics that have been argued in the literature
to be important determinants of voting behavior. (Geys, 2006; Tillman, 2008; Tillman,
2007) I included the age, and the education level of the respondent. I expect both these
variables to be positively related to the probability of voting, and the probability of
voting for the most closely placed political party. I also included a union membership
variable called union which is coded 1 if the respondent is a union member; 2 if he has
been in the past; 3 if he has never been a union member. I expect union membership
to positively a¤ect the probability of voting and the probability of voting for the party
that is placed closest to self by creating party identity.
4.4 The Results
The dependent variable for my analysis contains four discrete (unordered) cate-
gories. I employ multinomial logit analysis (MNL) to test my conjectures. MNL analy-
sis reports the e¤ect of each independent variable on the likelihood of the respondent
choosing one alternative over a baseline category. Voted for the closest party (proxim-
ity voting)is the baseline category, meaning that the coe¢ cients for other categories
show the e¤ect of each variable on the likelihood of a respondent belonging to those
categories versus belonging to the baseline category. Table 4.2 presents the results:
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Multinomial Regression Analysis Number of Observations: 1656
votstyle Coe¢ cient Std. Error z P>jzj
0
abstained -0.128 0.427 -0.30 0.765
identity -0.108 0.418 -0.26 0.797
euorgov -0.025 0.119 -0.21 0.834
closeness 0.005 0.034 0.16 0.871
education 0.095 0.069 1.37 0.171
age -0.005 0.007 -0.69 0.493
union 0.085 0.135 0.63 0.527
1
abstained 0.223 0.260 0.86 0.390
identity -0.509 0.251 -2.03 0.043
euorgov 0.125 0.076 1.64 0.102
closeness -0.002 0.022 -0.11 0.915
education -0.091 0.049 -1.85 0.064
age -0.001 0.005 -0.16 0.873
union 0.191 0.093 2.06 0.039
2
abstained 1.550 0.181 8.57 0.000
identity -1.440 0.191 -7.53 0.000
euorgov 0.192 0.070 2.73 0.006
closeness -0.028 0.021 -1.32 0.186
education -0.162 0.046 3.53 0.000
age -0.029 0.005 -6.32 0.000
union 0.257 0.085 3.03 0.002
votstyle=-1 is the base style
Table 4.2: Results-1
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As can be seen, a respondents belief about the EU e¤ect on domestic politics does
not lead to a signicant e¤ect on his likelihood of voting for a more moderate party than
the one he placed closest to himself, which means there is no evidence of strategically
voting for a moderate party due to expectations of a centrist policy pull by the EU.
I must also add that none of the variables I have identied seems to be a signicant
determinant of such voting behavior which leads me to conclude that strategic consid-
erations or personal characteristics are not related to a persons likelihood of voting for
a more moderate party than the one he perceives closest to himself. The determinants
of such voting behavior might simply be impulsive. Interestingly, we see a more sig-
nicant e¤ect (even though it is still not as statistically signicant as we would like)
on the likelihood of a respondent voting for a more extremist party than the one he
placed closest to himself. The estimated coe¢ cient of the likelihood of a respondent
belonging to the category of those who voted for a more extremist party than the one
they placed closest to themselves versus belonging to the baseline category which con-
tains those who voted for the party they placed closest to themselves is positive and of
considerable magnitude. That is, the ratio of these likelihoods increases considerably
as a respondent attributes more power to the EU e¤ect on domestic politics. we see
that having a party identity signicantly reduces the probability of a respondent be-
longing to this category, or in other words, signicantly increases the probability that
a respondent will use proximity voting. Another interesting result is that not being a
union member increases a respondents likelihood of acting against the predictions of
proximity voting and voting for a more extremist party than the one he placed closest
to himself. This might be because union membership creates party identication. Fi-
nally, we see a signicant negative e¤ect of education on the likelihood of a respondent
belonging to this category. More educated people are less likely to vote for a more
extremist party than the one they placed closest to themselves.
In terms of the likelihood of abstaining, the estimated coe¢ cient of euorgov indi-
cates a signicant relation between a respondents belief about the power of the EU
e¤ect on domestic politics and his likelihood of abstaining. Those who think that the
EU has more to do with the economic situation in the UK are more likely to abstain.
This result is in line with Tillmans (2008) ndings. Apparently, my model best explains
abstention behavior as almost all coe¢ cients in this category are highly signicant. As
previous literature suggested, having abstained in the previous election signicantly in-
creases the likelihood of abstaining this election as well, whereas having a party identity,
education, age and union membership signicantly reduce the probability of abstention.
Next, I rerun the multinomial logit analysis with the inclusion of respondentseval-
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uation of their own economic situation as an additional independent variable. Economic
considerations have been repeatedly found to a¤ect voting behavior (REF) and party
choice. Even though my dependent variable is about the choice among proximity vot-
ing, strategic non-proximity voting, and abstention, and not about party choice, I nd
it useful to test for any e¤ects economic considerations might have. The respondents
were asked to compare the nancial situation of their household at the time of the
survey with what it was 12 months ago. They choose among 1 to 5, 1 being got a
lot worseand 5 being got a lot better. I constructed the variable hhecon using the
responses given to this question. Table 4.3 presents the results. As can be seen the
results do not change much with the inclusion of household economic situation evalua-
tions. The estimated coe¢ cient for this new variable fails to be statistically signicant
for all categories.
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Multinomial Regression Analysis Number of Observations: 1645
votstyle Coe¢ cient Std. Error z P>jzj
0
abstained -0.091 0.428 -0.21 0.831
identity -0.099 0.418 -0.24 0.813
euorgov -0.015 0.120 -0.12 0.903
closeness 0.004 0.034 0.10 0.916
hhecon 0.069 0.118 0.59 0.557
education 0.097 0.069 1.39 0.163
age -0.005 0.007 -0.68 0.498
union 0.085 0.135 0.63 0.530
1
abstained 0.254 0.261 0.97 0.331
identity -0.496 0.252 -1.97 0.049
euorgov 0.122 0.077 1.59 0.113
closeness 0.001 0.022 0.04 0.970
hhecon -0.133 0.077 -1.72 0.086
education -0.086 0.049 -1.75 0.080
age -0.001 0.005 -0.21 0.832
union 0.184 0.093 1.97 0.048
2
abstained 1.573 0.182 8.62 0.000
identity -1.403 0.192 -7.29 0.000
euorgov 0.184 0.071 2.60 0.009
closeness -0.028 0.021 -1.34 0.181
hhecon -0.108 0.072 -1.52 0.130
education -0.157 0.046 -3.42 0.001
age -0.029 0.005 -6.40 0.000
union 0.255 0.085 3.00 0.003
votstyle=-1 is the base style
Table 4.3: Results-2
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Finally, I modied my dependent variable votstyle, and combined the two cate-
gories of strategic non-proximity voting. That is, the new dependent variable, which I
called votstyle3 (because it has three categories) has 3 categories rather than 4. Those
who voted for the party they placed closest to themselves make up the base category
again are coded 0; those who voted for a party other than the one they placed closest
to themselves are coded 1; and those who abstained are coded 2. I test whether a
respondents belief about the power of the EU e¤ect on domestic politics a¤ects his
choice among these categories. Table 4.4 presents the results. As can be seen from the
table, the results do not change much. A respondents belief about the power of the EU
e¤ect on domestic politics signicantly a¤ects his likelihood of abstention. In terms of
a respondents likelihood of voting for a party that he did not place closest to himself,
we see that the EU e¤ect is in the expected direction, that is, the likelihood increases
as a respondent attributes more power to the EU, but the estimated parameter does
not have enough statistical signicance.
Multinomial Regression Analysis Number of Observations: 1656
votstyle3 Coe¢ cient Std. Error z P>jzj
1
abstained 0.137 0.236 0.58 0.562
euorgov 0.084 0.068 1.24 0.217
identity -0.409 0.231 -1.77 0.076
education -0.036 0.042 -0.85 0.396
age -0.002 0.004 -0.42 0.672
union 0.161 0.081 1.97 0.049
closeness -0.0001 0.020 -0.01 0.996
2
abstained 1.548 0.181 8.57 0.000
euorgov 0.191 0.070 2.72 0.007
identity -1.438 0.191 -7.52 0.000
education -0.160 0.046 -3.51 0.000
age -0.029 0.005 -6.33 0.000
union 0.256 0.085 3.02 0.002
closeness -0.028 0.021 -1.32 0.187
votstyle3=0 is the base style
Table 4.4: Results-3
85
4.5 Conclusion
The literature on the e¤ects of EU membership on voting behavior in national
elections has so far concentrated on investigating whether EU advocacy became another
cleavage in national politics, and on investigating whether the EU control over economic
policies leads to a weakening of economic voting. These perspectives fail to capture
the structural e¤ects EU membership has on domestic political competition. It has
been commonly argued that EU membership imposes constraints on domestic policy
alternatives in both economic and non-economic policy areas, and thus, limits the
capacity of parties and political elites to deliver policy (Gabel, 2000; Hix, 2000). Thus,
both perspectives are limited in their ability to comprehensively capture the EU e¤ect
on voting behavior in national elections.
This article o¤ers a more comprehensive approach. I argue that EU membership
creates a centrist pull over alternative policies in member states, and that voters in EU
member countries, while formulating their vote, take into account this central pull the
EU will have on the nal policy outcomes in their countries. I construct a simple, single-
dimensional decision theoretical model to depict these arguments, and I derive three
conjectures from my model, namely that the EU e¤ect may alter votersevaluations of
ideological proximity between themselves and political parties, and (i) may lead them
to vote for parties they perceive more extremist than themselves, and for whom they
would not have voted for had the EU e¤ect been absent; (ii) may lead them to vote
for parties they perceive more moderate then themselves, and for whom they would
not have voted for had the EU e¤ect been absent; (iii) may lead them to abstain.
I empirically test these conjectures using survey data from the 2001 British Election
Study. The results support the third conjecture, and demonstrate that a respondent
who believes the EU has control over the economic situation in the UK is more likely
to abstain. I also nd limited support for the second conjecture. The results indicate
a positive, albeit not statistically signicant enough, relation between a respondents
belief about the power of the EU e¤ect and his likelihood of voting for a more extremist
party than the one he placed closest to himself. The rst conjecture is not supported
by the data.
This chapter provides a good example of introduction of an external veto player
into an existing political system. The EU, with its centrist pull on policies acts as a
veto player. The chapter investigates whether and how the introduction of this new
veto player is perceived by existing actors.
There are limitations to this chapters analyses. The rst is that it is limited to one
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election study in a single country. This limitation results from the absence of equivalent
questions in other election studies conducted in other countries. A study of a single
election always leaves open the chance that various factors unique to this election have
biased the results. A panel data set including other countries and other election studies
would certainly render the results more credible and conclusive. Unfortunately, this
limitation will have to stand until future data become available.
Another limitation is that the analysis ignores any strategic changes political parties
may have gone through in EU member states. If political parties in EU member coun-
tries adopt their political stances and the policies they advocate when they are faced
with the constraints EU membership imposes on their ability to deliver alternative
policies, then we should also expect voters to adjust their placement of political parties
accordingly (Hix, 2003). Then we should investigate the EU e¤ect in party placements
of voters rather than their voting behavior. Mair (2000) and Krouwel (2004) argue
that European integration has had virtually no e¤ect on the format of national party
systems which implies this limitation may not present severe problems for the analysis.
Nevertheless, future research should address these limitations.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies political decision making through a veto players approach
which entails identifying those political actors with the power to veto the decision, and
understanding the political outcome as a product of the interaction of these actors.
The veto players literature so far takes veto players as simple, domestic actors with
given preferences that are common knowledge to everyone. This approach leaves out
any strategic interaction that may take place among veto players as it treats them as
commonly known preference proles, and thus creates serious gaps in the literature.
This dissertation aims to ll these gaps in the literature by treating veto players, and
those third parties that the veto players are accountable to as strategic actors in the
game of politics which may take place in limited-information settings. The second
important factor that the literature has not explored yet is the emergence of new veto
players. This dissertation acknowledges that in certain policy areas the set of relevant
veto players may include foreign actors as well as domestic ones, and analyzes how the
emergence and the existence of these new players inuence political decision making and
the resulting policies. Finally, the fact that veto players in a political system are either
elected or appointed, and thus are usually accountable to those who elect or appoint
them, is the third factor that the veto players literature has yet to take into account.
This dissertation includes those third parties as strategic players in the game of political
decision making, and thus contributes towards lling out this gap in the literature. The
chapters investigate general questions on institutions and political decision making while
drawing upon specic examples from Turkish politics using formal analysis, and game
theoretical and statistical tools.
In the second chapter, by the use of a simple spatial model of policy choice, I have
demonstrated that the existence of a veto player might a¤ect the nature and timing
of policy change and even render inaction in specic issue areas a rational choice for a
government. Mymotivating example in this chapter was the turban issue which has been
occupying the Turkish political scene since the late 1990s, and the AKP governments
approach to the more general question of the role of religion in politics and public life.
I built a very simplistic version of a governments policy making problem in one specic
area. The government is constrained only by the preferences of its core constituency and
the preferences of a single veto player. In reality there are of course further complicating
factors that exists in the political environment. As I have discussed before there may be
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multiple veto players, including coalition partners in the case of a coalition government
and the opposition parties in the parliament depending on the number of chairs each
party holds. Depending on the electoral laws there may be further complications. A
further complication might arise from other informational imperfections. In my model
I assumed that the government only lacks information about veto costs, and has perfect
information about the ideal policies of the core constituency and the veto player. It
might be that the government has only a probabilistic view of these as well. My model
does not allow any communication among players that might alleviate informational
problems. In reality, one would expect the government to communicate with all other
relevant players, especially while formulating a new policy. More importantly, the
core constituency is probably not the only ones whose support the government cares
about. Depending on the policy area, the government might be aiming to please groups
outside its core constituency, or it might be considering the support it gets from the
whole spectrum of voters rather than just its core constituency. So,the distribution of
ideal points of other voters and their policy sensitivities might also be important in
making a policy decision. To extend this model to include these further constraints
remains a challenging task and is left for further research.
In the third chapter, I turned to linkage politics and develop a game theoretical
model that explains how the existence of domestic veto players can obstruct interna-
tional cooperation through studying a model that demonstrates how an international
agreement signed by representatives of two countries can fail parliamentary ratica-
tion. My motivating example in this chapter was the military cooperation agreement
ratication failure crises of 2003 between Turkey and the United States. I studied a
scenario in which the executives of two countries bargain on a cooperative agreement
to replace the existing state of a¤airs between them. The agreement comes into e¤ect
only if it gets ratied by the parliaments in the two countries. One of the executives
lacks information about parliamentary preferences in her country. I allowed communi-
cation between agents and showed that under certain assumptions, the informational
deciency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences. Thus, there is a
positive probability that the international agreement will fail ratication. I also showed
that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive towards cooper-
ation with the other country prefers to be represented by a risk averse executive in the
international bargain rather than a risk neutral one. This model can easily be adapted
to study domestic veto bargaining situations in presidential bicameral systems where
the president holds a veto over proposed legislation and/or principal-agent relations
where an imperfectly informed principal holds a veto over the actions of an agent. I
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leave such applications for further projects.
I continued my focus on linkage politics in the fourth chapter. My argument in this
chapter was that increased interdependence among countries, either through interna-
tional organization membership or through economic interdependence, introduces new
and outsider veto players to polities. The introduction of these new veto players brings
in new information to the attention of the domestic constituency who then change their
behavior accordingly. Specically, I argued that EU membership creates a centrist pull
over alternative policies in member states, and that voters in EU member countries,
while formulating their vote, take into account this central pull the EU will have on the
nal policy outcomes in their countries. I empirically tested my arguments and found
partial support which indicates the necessity of further research on the issue. There are
of course limitations to this chapters analyses. The rst is that the empirical analysis
is limited to just one election study in a single country because of data availability
issues for other studies and countries. A study of a single election always leaves open
the chance that various factors unique to this election have biased the results. A panel
data set including other countries and other election studies would certainly render the
results more credible and conclusive. Unfortunately, this limitation will have to stand
until future data become available. Another limitation is that the analysis ignores any
strategic changes political parties may have gone through in EU member states. If
political parties in EU member countries adopt their political stances and the policies
they advocate when they are faced with the constraints EU membership imposes on
their ability to deliver alternative policies, then we should also expect voters to adjust
their placement of political parties accordingly. Then we should investigate the EU
e¤ect in party placements of voters rather than their voting behavior. Future research
should address these limitations.
To summarize, this dissertation follows the veto players approach in political stud-
ies. Previous research has proven the generalizability and explanatory power of the
approach but there still remains some important aspects of political life like the strate-
gic interaction among veto players in political environments of asymmetric information;
the e¤ects of introducing new veto players to existing political systems; and the e¤ects
of possible accountability relations between veto players and third parties that need to
be addressed. This dissertation aims to address these aspects, and thus, ll out the
gaps in the literature while drawing upon specic examples from Turkish politics. The
contribution, in that sense, is fourfold: lling out the gaps in the veto players literature;
furthering our understanding of Turkish politics; proving that Turkish politics is a po-
litical system that can be studied and understood within the general frameworks and
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theories of political science; and nally attracting scholarly interest to Turkish politics
by demonstrating how it can be a lucrative ground for political science research.
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